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President
uring the recent economic crisis, the 
Federal Reserve deployed nearly every 
resource at its disposal to restore the 
financial system to working order and 
guide the economy out of recession. 
These efforts shaped news coverage—and public per-
ception—of the central bank’s work. The media focused 
on Washington’s activities, scrutinizing the details of 
every initiative by the Federal Open Market Committee 
(FOMC) and the Board of Governors. The commen-
tary—a mix of the good, the bad and the ugly—cen-
tered primarily on the historic nature of our programs, 
their potential market impacts and their reception by 
the powerhouses of Washington and Wall Street.
The Federal Reserve System’s extraordinary ef-
forts were not limited to the FOMC. As I frequently 
remind the press and public, members of the commit-
tee rely on the dedicated staff of the Federal Reserve 
Banks for the execution of each initiative. Without the 
hard work of the regional Banks—including the men 
and women of the Federal Reserve Bank of Dallas—we 
might not have staved off economic collapse.
With financial markets drained of confidence and 
liquidity, it became critical that lending to deposi-
tory institutions be properly designed and flawlessly 
executed. To aid in this effort, our staff continued to 
maintain and refine the application used throughout 
the Federal Reserve System for discount window lend-
ing operations—an important responsibility in a year 
when the Dallas Fed saw a prodigious increase in the 
number of loans extended.
D
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many new programs and initiatives designed to assist 
in the implementation of monetary policy, including 
interest payments on reserves and enhancement of con-
trols that manage credit risk. The Dallas Fed also con-
tributed to the detailed requirements and design of the 
proposed term deposit facility, one of several tools that 
may be used to support a smooth withdrawal of mon-
etary policy accommodation at the appropriate time.
The Dallas Fed’s supervision and regulation 
team made a vital contribution to financial safety and 
soundness. Our experienced staff of bank examiners 
refocused their tactics, paying heightened attention to 
risk. We established a support unit to coordinate re-
sources, ensuring that the most experienced examin-
ers worked with financial institutions facing the most 
severe challenges. We continued to beef up our sta-
tistical bank-risk assessments and extend their use 
to credit risk to help identify shaky institutions at the 
earliest possible sign. The breadth of knowledge ac-
crued by our bank supervisors, coupled with relatively 
favorable banking conditions in our district, put us at 
the forefront in providing examiner assistance to other 
Federal Reserve districts and government agencies.
Getting the Word Out
The financial crisis intensified the public’s need 
for insight and information—and mine, too. Our 
research staff increased the frequency of regional, na-
tional and international briefings to keep me apprised 
of economic developments. In Dallas Fed publica-
tions, our economists produced articles on pressing 
issues—foreclosures, financial markets and our local 
economy’s battle with recession, to name a few. Highly 
respected journals and news media around the world 
cited many of our efforts. In addition, Bank staffers 
significantly expanded their speaking engagements 
and participation in conferences across the country, 
doing their best to contribute to the national dialogue 
on the Great Recession. Members of the Dallas Fed’s 
Globalization and Monetary Policy Institute—our flag-
ship center for study of an increasingly interconnect-
ed world economy and its effects on monetary policy—
briefed the FOMC on global inflation dynamics.
In response to the nation’s mortgage foreclosure 
woes, the Bank collaborated with consumer and com-
munity organizations to launch the Dallas–Fort Worth 
Home Ownership Preservation Enterprise (HOPE) 
Partnership. Since its 2005 inception, the group has 
mobilized lenders and housing counselors for work-
shops to assist thousands of homeowners in resolving 
their delinquent loans and avoiding foreclosure. The 
success of those efforts led to the formation of the 
Greater Houston Foreclosure Prevention and Texas 
Foreclosure Prevention task forces. The Bank joined 
with the Texas task force to run consumer awareness 
ads in movie theaters, alerting consumers to scams 
and other fraudulent activities that might affect them.
Our public outreach initiatives provided our audi-
ences with up-to-date information on the economic 
landscape. To address the causes and effects of the 
financial crisis and to promote better understanding 
of the recession, the Bank provided timely programs 
to secondary educators and university and college 
faculty. This effort came in the form of conferences 
and presentations at a variety of venues, including 
the Bank and branch offices, on school campuses and 
at national and state conferences. And we took the 
discussion to Main Street, organizing programs and 
hosting roundtable discussions with bankers and civic 
leaders in communities in Texas, northern Louisiana 
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nity development lending and entrepreneurship in the 
changing economy provided constituents with impor-
tant information at a time of economic upheaval. 
Staying on Course 
In addition to meeting the demands of the eco-
nomic downturn, we maintained customer service 
excellence in our financial services. To support the 
needs of the marketplace, we redistributed to other 
Reserve Banks nearly 700 million new notes ware-
housed in our vaults on behalf of the Board of Gover-
nors and the U.S. Treasury. In 2009, the Dallas Fed 
provided cash to more than 3,700 banks and branch-
es, circulating some 5.7 billion bills through our 
vault doors. Our coin holdings increased almost 20 
percent from the prior year as coin flowed back from 
circulation and other sources at an unprecedented 
rate. During 2009, the Federal Reserve continued the 
consolidation of check processing functions. Dallas 
ceased processing paper checks as that business was 
transferred to the Cleveland Reserve Bank, ending 
a function that had been conducted in Dallas since 
1915. This transition resulted in a significant down-
sizing of our staff but was accomplished with minimal 
customer impact.
In an ongoing initiative to help the U.S. Treasury 
reduce costs, our Go Direct contact center in Dal-
las continued enrolling federal benefit recipients in 
its electronic deposit program. The contact center 
processed more than 690,000 enrollments in 2009, a 
20 percent increase over 2008. Since 2004, the Dallas 
Fed has processed almost 2.5 million enrollments. In 
2009, we developed technology enhancements that 
helped reduce enrollment times, providing a signifi-
cant cost savings for the Treasury and the taxpayer.
The Bank’s role in supporting the technology 
infrastructure for the Federal Reserve System helped 
maintain effective operations during the crisis. In 
addition to providing and supporting the application 
used by all Reserve Banks for lending activities, the 
Bank provides the financial management system used 
by all Reserve Banks for procurement, asset manage-
ment and accounts payable. Bank staff fostered sig-
nificant improvements in the Federal Reserve’s desk-
top computing infrastructure, supporting the work 
of more than 20,000 employees across the System. 
In addition, we upgraded our telecommunications 
complex and hosted an 85 percent increase in secure 
conference calls for the System, supporting increased 
demand for communication and collaboration.
Suffice it to say that the staff of the Federal 
Reserve Bank of Dallas and its branches worked long 
and hard, rising to the challenges presented in 2009. 
Their hard work enabled the Federal Reserve to do 
what it must do in times of economic turmoil—bring a 
sense of stability and calm to an economy wrought by 
contraction and panic. I speak for all my colleagues on 
the FOMC and the constituents of the Eleventh District 
when I say how grateful I am for a job well done.
Richard W. Fisher
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he past two and a half years have 
been challenging ones for the Federal 
Reserve. The financial market turmoil 
that began in mid-2007 plunged the 
U.S. economy into a stubborn down-
turn that raised fears of another Great Depression. 
Determined to avoid the monetary policy mistakes of 
the 1930s, the Fed met the crisis head-on, taking a 
series of bold policy actions that lowered interest rates 
and funneled credit directly to the private sector.
By the end of 2009, we could breathe easier. 
Confidence in the banking industry is on the mend, 
financial markets are returning to normalcy and the 
economy is showing signs of recovery, however tepid. 
It is time to look back—to see what we have learned—
and to look forward to reshaping the policy environ-
ment, with an eye toward lessening the odds of future 
financial crises.
I come away from the past two years with four 
fundamental beliefs—all honed not only by my five 
years as a monetary policymaker but also by my 
decades of experience as a market operator. First, I 
am more convinced than ever that financial institu-
tions and financial markets require a healthy dose of 
regulation to function efficiently. Second, I am more 
convinced than ever of the importance of regulatory 
and supervisory authority to the proper conduct of 
monetary policy. Third, I am more convinced than ever 
T
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Where Do We Go From Here?
An Essay by Richard W. Fisherthat too-big-to-fail banks are dangerous and should 
be contained, if not broken up. Fourth, I am more 
convinced than ever that central banks operate most 
effectively when insulated from political passions.
Taken together, these beliefs underscore the 
necessity of a forward-looking, carefully crafted re-
structuring of the financial system. An approach that 
scuttles such time-tested fundamentals as central 
bank independence will do more harm than good. At 
the same time, simply defending the status quo will 
take us down the same path to crisis and recession. 
We do not want to just do a better job cleaning up the 
messes in the financial system. We want to avoid the 
messes in the first place. Only by arriving at the right 
regulatory calibration can we adequately protect our 
financial system, and the economy that depends on 
it, from a repeat of the severe boom-to-bust cycle we 
have just been through.
Only by arriving at the right 
regulatory calibration can we 
adequately protect our 
financial system.
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. . . the right regulatory calibrationBooms, Bubbles and Busts
am a fierce advocate of free markets. The 
now-fabled Invisible Hand directs produc-
ers to use scarce resources efficiently to 
churn out an abundance of the goods 
and services consumers want. We have 
the magic of the market to thank for the creation of 
America’s unmatched productive capacity and high 
living standards. Too much regulation burdens eco-
nomic activity. Even so, my previous incarnation as 
a financial market operator left no doubt in my mind 
that markets do occasionally fail: Most notably, asset 
prices overshoot during booms and bubbles and over-
correct during busts.
By itself, volatility is not sufficient justification 
for regulation. However, market failures that roil 
the financial system can have disastrous repercus-
sions, setting off an adverse financial feedback loop of 
contracting credit flows, declining economic activity 
and sustained high unemployment. This reminds us 
of the vital role money and credit play in maintain-
ing a healthy economy. I liken it to the cardiovascular 
system. In an economy, the central bank is the heart, 
money is the lifeblood, and financial markets are the 
arteries and capillaries that provide critical sustenance 
to the muscles—the makers of goods and services and 
creators of employment. A properly functioning cardio-
vascular system fosters healthy growth; if that system 
fails, the muscles atrophy and the body breaks down.
i
. . . wringing out the economy’s excesses
The goal should be not simply 
more regulation but rules that 
clamp down where they are 
needed the most.
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liquidity is restrained, creating a major blockage in 
the financial intermediation process. Credit stops 
flowing to businesses and consumers, spreading the 
contagion throughout the economy. That is what hap-
pened in the most recent crisis. Elaborate statistical 
models and complex securitization products created 
the illusion of control over credit and liquidity risk 
in the banking system. Misperceptions of risk and 
misplaced incentives led to misguided actions. As 
market participants uncovered the truth—as they 
always do, however late—confidence quickly gave way 
to fear and doubt. With uncertainty in full fever, cash 
was hoarded, counterparties viewed each other with 
suspicion and no business appeared worthy of financ-
ing. The economy, starved of the lifeblood of capital, 
weakened further.
By now, I suspect many share my conviction re-
garding the need for improved financial regulation. We 
are even hearing a different tune from those who only 
a few years ago proclaimed the transcendent efficiency 
of financial markets—what I refer to as “the elaborate 
conceit of efficient market theory”—where today’s 
prices are always right, markets are self-correcting 
and regulation is best kept to a bare minimum.
Our prosperity requires that financial regulation 
and supervision maintain the safety and soundness 
necessary for healthy economic growth. The mission 
of regulators is to ensure banks are sturdy—and to 
shut them down if they are not. We do not want our 
zeal for restructuring the regulatory architecture to 
obscure our fundamental belief in the power of the 
market mechanisms. We need to weigh costs and ben-
efits of our regulatory apparatus to determine what 
needs to go and what needs to be added. The goal 
should be not simply more regulation but rules that 
clamp down where they are needed the most, such as 
excessive risk-taking. An effective regulatory regime 
strives to corral the financial markets’ animal spirits 
in a way that does not inhibit the vital work of under-
writing prosperity but discourages straying into yet 
another reckless escapade—a delicate balance indeed.
 
 
An effective regulatory regime 
strives to corral the financial 
markets’ animal spirits in a way 
that does not inhibit the vital 
work of underwriting prosperity 
but discourages straying into yet 
another reckless escapade—a 
delicate balance indeed.
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. . . wringing out the economy’s excessesThe Fed as Regulator
he glamour of central banking lies 
in monetary policy. The media take 
note of every meeting of the Fed-
eral Open Market Committee, or 
FOMC, and nearly every utterance 
by its members. But making monetary policy deci-
sions requires an intimate knowledge of the financial 
system—the type of knowledge that only a hands-on 
regulator can possess. To obtain that knowledge, we 
rely upon our regulatory and supervisory responsibili-
ties—responsibilities we share with the Comptroller 
of the Currency, the Federal Deposit Insurance Corp., 
the Office of Thrift Supervision and state agencies, 
among others.
In theory, the Fed’s monetary policy and regu-
latory functions are separate. In practice, they are 
anything but—rather, they have a symbiotic relation-
ship. They complement each other because effective 
monetary policy depends on regulation that ensures 
the soundness of financial institutions.
To understand why, we start with how monetary 
policy influences economic activity and employ-
ment. Traditionally, the FOMC’s primary policy tool 
is the federal funds rate—the interest rate that banks 
charge one another for unsecured, overnight loans. 
Channeled through the financial system, changes in 
the federal funds rate affect private sector decisions 
on how much to produce and how many workers will 
be needed to do it.
 . . . keeping banks on the straight and narrow
T
Effective monetary policy 
depends on regulation that 
ensures the soundness of 
financial institutions.
8     FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF DALLAS • 2009 Annual ReportChanges in the federal funds rate directly and 
indirectly influence the cost and availability of credit 
throughout the economy. Banks respond by adjusting 
the pricing and terms they offer to borrowers, affect-
ing buying and investing decisions. Money and capital 
markets usually move in the same direction, pinching 
or swelling the flow of funds to larger businesses. In-
terest rate changes affect the value of bonds, equities, 
real estate and other assets, the sources of consum-
ers’ and businesses’ wealth that often serve as collat-
eral for loans. If interest rate movements are larger in 
the U.S. than overseas, exchange rates may go up or 
down, affecting international trade and capital flows. 
Financial regulation’s importance to monetary policy 
centers on keeping these vital arteries open—a job 
accomplished by establishing rules for sound banking 
practices and making sure that banks follow them.
The gears linking Fed policy and the real econo-
my operate smoothly and predictably when banks are 
well capitalized—that is, when they have the financial 
wherewithal to make loans. This allows the arter-
ies of the system to be open and healthy and strong. 
Troubles come when banks’ finances are shaky—
when the regulatory process has not kept banks 
sound. Sick banks cannot lend and properly act as in-
termediators—and monetary policy actions lose their 
capacity to influence the economy with accustomed 
efficiency. This is what happened in the financial 
crisis. Weakened by bad loans and investments that 
led to massive writedowns, financial institutions were 
in no position to make new loans because they faced 
an immediate need to raise new capital. The cost of 
that capital spiked just when banks needed it the 
most. The financial system crouched in a defensive 
stance, tightening its lending standards and charging 
more for credit. Traditional Fed policy lost its potency. 
As the FOMC pushed the federal funds rate to the 
lowest levels ever in 2008, the rates that matter most 
for spurring economic recovery—the rates charged on 
credit to businesses and households—rose signifi-
cantly, leaving the Fed to resort to extraordinary poli-
cies to inject liquidity into the economy.
I think it is worth discussing an 
expanded Fed regulatory role 
in nonbank financial institutions. 
This is where a great deal of 
the reckless lending, perverse 
incentives and, in some cases, 
downright dishonesty took place 
in the years leading up to the 
financial crisis.
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 . . . keeping banks on the straight and narrowThe past two years have highlighted the intercon-
nections of monetary and regulatory policy, under-
scoring the need for the Fed to maintain a major 
role in regulating and supervising firms across the 
financial system. The central bank cannot conduct 
monetary policy effectively without targeted and time-
ly information on the health of the financial system. 
We depend on our regulatory arm to provide in-depth, 
hands-on assessments to guide us as we perform our 
duty as the financial system’s lender of last resort—a 
duty that requires us to “know our customers,” as the 
old banking adage goes. We cannot perform that duty 
or operate a discount window if we lack a firsthand 
knowledge of our borrowers’ financial health. It is sim-
ply impossible to properly evaluate the condition of a 
potentially troubled borrower with information gener-
ated by an outside agency, which might not give us 
what we need or might not be sufficiently responsive in 
real time. This was one of the harsh lessons learned 
from examining the entrails of Bear Stearns, Lehman 
and AIG, over which we had no regulatory oversight at 
the time of their rupture.
Only by staying abreast of developments in the 
banking and financial system can the Fed acquire the 
knowledge necessary to implement monetary policy 
effectively. And only then—with full responsibility and 
accountability for financial stability—can the Fed be 
fully effective in pursuing its dual mandate of stable 
prices and full employment.
Keeping monetary and 
regulatory policy together 
reinforces accountability.
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. . . crafting the right mix of policiesKeeping monetary and regulatory policy together 
reinforces accountability. At any given time, maintain-
ing a healthy economy and sound banking system 
may require a purely regulatory response, a purely 
monetary response or a combination of the two. The 
appropriate mix may be unclear to an agency that has 
but a single mission. If monetary and regulatory au-
thorities are separate, each side might justify inaction 
when tough decisions are needed by claiming it as-
sumed the other would act. By placing responsibility 
for both monetary and regulatory policies under one 
authority, the blame game is no longer possible.
It is essential that the Fed not only maintain but 
also enhance its role in banking and financial regula-
tion. I do not want a turf war with other regulators. In 
fact, I see advantages to maintaining several overlap-
ping but separate regulatory approaches—different 
sets of eyes looking at the situation from different 
perspectives. However, I think it is worth discussing 
an expanded Fed regulatory role in nonbank financial 
institutions—also known as the shadow banking sys-
tem. This is where a great deal of the reckless lending, 
perverse incentives and, in some cases, downright 
dishonesty took place in the years leading up to the 
financial crisis. 
In my view, proposals to shrink the Fed’s regula-
tory and supervisory responsibilities are misguided. To 
keep with my cardiovascular analogy, I would argue 
that removing the Fed from supervision and regulation 
of banks of all sizes and complexity—from community 
banks to the most complex large financial institutions 
(LFIs)—would be the equivalent of ripping out the pa-
tient’s heart. That would surely prevent another heart 
attack but would likely have serious health repercus-
sions. If we are to lower the chances of repeating the 
crisis we have just endured, the Fed must be deeply 
involved in financial supervision and regulation—so it 
can recognize the signs of an economy that is over-
heating. The Fed must address the extreme fringe of 
aggressive risk taking in a more preventive way, using 
all its available tools to prevent the next bubble from 
reaching critical mass. And—this is a crucial “and”—it 
will need to do a better job. 
The Fed must be deeply involved 
in financial supervision and 
regulation—so it can recognize 
the signs of an economy that is 
overheating.
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. . . crafting the right mix of policiesToo-Dangerous-to-Permit
 
truly effective restructuring of 
our regulatory regime will have to 
neutralize the biggest threat to our 
financial system’s stability—the 
so-called too-big-to-fail, or TBTF, 
banks. In the past two decades, the biggest banks 
have grown significantly bigger. In 1990, the 10 larg-
est U.S. banks had almost 25 percent of the indus-
try’s assets. Their share grew to 44 percent in 2000 
and almost 60 percent in 2009. 
Banking has become more concentrated at the 
top because of laws that allow institutions to oper-
ate nationwide and offer a broader range of financial 
services. However, some of this growth has occurred 
because of the government guarantees—implicit as 
well as explicit—that allow big financial institutions 
to grow faster by pursuing riskier strategies that yield 
higher returns, at least in good times. 
The risks of the 21st century are no match for 
a regulatory scheme put in place in the 1930s, then 
revised in a piecemeal fashion since. The existing rules 
and oversight are not up to the acute regulatory chal-
lenge imposed by the biggest banks. First, these banks 
are sprawling and complex—so vast that their own 
management teams may not fully understand their 
own risk exposures. If that is so, it would be futile to 
expect that their regulators and creditors could untan-
gle all the threads, especially under rapidly changing 
market conditions. Second, big banks may believe they 
can act recklessly without fear of paying the ultimate 
penalty. They and many of their creditors assume the 
Fed and other government agencies will cushion the 
fall and assume the damages, even if their troubles 
stem from negligence or trickery. They have only to 
look to recent experience to confirm that assumption.
A
The existing rules and oversight 
are not up to the acute 
regulatory challenge imposed 
by the biggest banks.
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. . . institutions of more manageable sizeSome argue that bigness is not bad, per se. They 
contend that the U.S. cannot maintain its competi-
tive edge on the global stage if it cedes LFI territory to 
other nations—an argument I consider hollow given 
the experience of the Japanese and others who came 
to regret seeking the distinction of having the world’s 
biggest financial institutions. Big banks interact with 
the economy and financial markets in a multitude of 
ways, creating connections that transcend the limits 
of industry and geography. Because of their deep and 
wide connections to other banks and financial institu-
tions, a few really big banks can send tidal waves of 
troubles through the financial system if they fail, lead-
ing to a downward spiral of bad loans and contracting 
credit that destroys many jobs and businesses. 
No government wants to take that risk. So in hard 
times, regulators dutifully close smaller banks—the 
FDIC shut down 25 banks in 2008 and 140 in 2009—
but tiptoe around big banks with shaky financial 
foundations. Weak TBTF banks are propped up, even 
if their capacity to lend has been seriously compro-
mised. And so they sit in limbo, a potential obstacle to 
monetary policy because of their power to obstruct the 
channels that transmit Fed actions to the economy.
I have not been reticent about the dangers posed 
by TBTF banks. To be sure, having a clearly articulat-
ed “resolution regime” would represent steps forward, 
though I fear it might also provide false comfort—large 
firms under special resolution authorities might be 
viewed favorably by creditors, continuing the govern-
ment-sponsored advantage bestowed upon them. My 
preference is for a more prophylactic approach: an 
international accord to break up these institutions 
into ones of more manageable size—more manage-
able for both their executives and their regulatory 
supervisors. This cannot be done after the onset of an 
economic crisis, when the consequences of faltering 
TBTF institutions become a front-burner issue. By 
then, the mistakes have been made and cannot be 
reversed, and TBTF banks plod along among the living 
like zombies in science fiction films.
The consequences are too dire. The time to break 
up TBTF banks is before the crisis—when the econo-
my is relatively healthy and they pose no immediate 
dangers. That way, they will not be around to wreak 
havoc when the economy enters a period of stress.
The time to break up TBTF banks 
is before the crisis—when the 
economy is relatively healthy 
and they pose no immediate 
dangers. That way, 
they will not be around to wreak 
havoc when the economy 
enters a period of stress.
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. . . institutions of more manageable sizeIndependence 
entral banks must take a long-term 
view of the economy and craft ap-
propriate policy responses. When 
the situation warrants, we must 
have the leeway to raise interest 
rates when others want cheap credit and rein in risky 
financial practices when others want easy profits. 
A Fed committed to wringing out the economy’s ex-
cesses and keeping banks on the straight and narrow 
is not going to win many popularity contests. Some of 
those displeased by Fed decisions will seek to satisfy 
their desires by resorting to political pressure. 
It is for that reason that Congress, nearly a 
century ago, had the foresight to establish the Federal 
Reserve System—a monetary authority, together with 
a regulatory arm, set apart from the exigencies of the 
day. While our tools and mission have evolved over 
time, our independence has remained paramount to 
our efforts to pursue a steady course untainted by 
political accommodation. 
Independent does not mean unaccountable. The 
Fed has always been subject to appropriate oversight 
and transparency. The Fed chairman and members of 
the Board of Governors are nominated by the presi-
dent and confirmed by the Senate. Our statutory au-
thority includes a grant of certain powers to influence 
the financial system, and that authority is limited to 
our mandated goals of sustainable employment growth 
and price stability, along with the prerequisite objec-
tive of banking and financial stability. We are the only 
business I know of that releases a public accounting 
of its balance sheet every week—the H.4.1 release, 
available on the Internet. Since Ben Bernanke took the 
chair, we have ramped up our efforts to be as trans-
parent as is prudent in the conduct of monetary poli-
cy. We now release more fulsome economic projections 
and minutes of our meetings. At the semiannual testi-
mony before Congress required under the Humphrey–
Hawkins legislation, the Chairman fields questions 
from members of appropriate oversight committees, 
and we have responded favorably to those suggestions 
that aid the Fed’s ability to fulfill its mission.
However, Fed policymakers maintain distance 
from the political fray because board members serve 
staggered, 14-year terms, muting White House influ-
ence. The regional bank presidents, who serve along-
side the governors on the FOMC, are further insulated 
because they are hired and fired at the will of their 
boards of directors. These nine-member boards are 
entirely removed from the D.C. establishment, with 
C
. . . independence has remained paramount
A politicized central bank is a 
crippled central bank. 
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of three members. Needless to say, my fellow bank 
presidents and I, and our boards, represent the views 
of our constituents on Main Street—not those of the 
Washington elite. 
A Fed insulated from short-term, political im-
pulses can focus on crafting the right mix of policies 
for the economy in the long term. It has enough space 
to make the tough calls—most notably, when interest 
rates have to be pushed upward to slow the economy 
in flush times. Fed independence does not just matter 
for monetary policy. A central bank insulated from pol-
itics and accompanying lobbying can also be a tougher 
regulator, insisting on strict adherence to capital and 
leverage requirements and prudent lending.
Central bank independence has become the global 
standard. Nations around the world have come to 
realize that successful central banks must be indepen-
dent from political pressures. The European Cen-
tral Bank—the monetary authority that governs the 
nations of the European Union—was established in 
1998 and guaranteed political independence by treaty. 
Banco de México’s insulation from political consider-
ations has been codified in the country’s constitution. 
Over the past few decades, numerous economic 
studies have shown that independent monetary 
authorities are indeed associated with lower inflation 
and higher, steadier economic growth. History tells 
us what happens when central banks succumb to 
the political demands of the day. The examples of the 
havoc wrought by politicized central banks stretch 
from ancient Rome to modern-day Zimbabwe, where 
hyperinflation effectively destroyed the currency and 
the nation’s economy. 
In his entertaining book Lords of Finance, Liaquat 
Ahamed tells an interesting anecdote arising from 
the German Reichsbank’s founding in the 1870s. At 
the time, Otto von Bismarck received a warning from 
his confidant Gershon Bleichröder: “There would be 
occasions when political considerations would have to 
override purely economic judgments.” Bleichröder in-
formed Bismarck that “at such times too independent 
a central bank would be a nuisance.”
Herr Bleichröder’s advice proved particularly un-
wise. Students of economic history are keenly aware of 
the political crisis that faced Germany after World War I 
and how it contributed to the debilitating hyperinflation 
that nearly destroyed the German economy. I am sure 
that most Germans who suffered through that difficult 
period would have gladly seen the Reichsbank act a 
nuisance in the name of economic sanity.
Bleichröder’s mistake highlights an important 
fact: A politicized central bank is a crippled central 
bank. Leaders in Congress and the White House 
would do well to recall the relevant historic precedents 
as we emerge from this, the greatest financial crisis in 
post-World War II history. Our nation’s monetary au-
thority must retain its separation from political pres-
sures, or it will have no hope of operating effectively 
and responsibly.
Our nation’s monetary authority 
must retain its separation from 
political pressures, or it will 
have no hope of operating 
effectively and responsibly.
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. . . independence has remained paramountAddressing Our Critics
ome may argue that the Fed had its 
chance and muffed it. They will say 
we failed to act despite the ominous 
signs that preceded these past two 
years of economic woe—so we should 
not have the broad authority and independence we 
had leading up to the crisis. 
I have been in outspoken agreement on the first 
point—that we at the Fed made mistakes. I have 
stated many times that regulators at the Fed, and 
those at other agencies, were insufficiently vigilant 
about the risk exposures and overall financial mania 
that permeated our economic system. In all can-
dor, we at the central bank should have seen these 
problems coming and acted to defuse them. With the 
benefit of hindsight, we see that our monetary policy 
was too loose and our regulatory practices were not 
tight enough.
s
Public policy should promote 
economic growth that is 
sustainable rather than fleeting.
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. . . a long-term view of the economyThe Fed is taking the necessary steps to address 
these concerns, recalibrating and repairing its regula-
tory and supervisory apparatus to encompass more 
preventive and coordinated measures. We intend to 
move forward with this new and improved tool kit, 
putting it to use in conjunction with the execution of 
sound monetary policy.
To our critics’ second point—that the Fed’s au-
thority or independence should be reduced—I might 
refer them to the four convictions I laid out earlier in 
this essay. Booms propelled by greed and busts born 
of fear are as old as time itself. As Charles Mackay 
reminded us nearly 170 years ago in his book Memoirs 
of Extraordinary Popular Delusions, “Men … think in 
herds; it will be seen that they go mad in herds.…” This 
quirk of human nature will always ignite the euphoria 
that fuels the ups and exacerbates the downs. 
That is why we need a monetary policy that leans 
against that propensity for financial bubbles. We 
need regulatory and supervisory powers that lead to a 
policy that ensures a sound financial system, capable 
of most efficiently channeling central bank action to 
the real economy. We need to keep our monetary and 
regulatory authority united, so we can work together 
in the interest of the entire financial system—not just 
the interests of the largest institutions and those too 
big to fail. And we need to ensure that this authority 
is free from short-term political pressures. 
Public policy should promote economic growth 
that is sustainable rather than fleeting. After seeing 
our economy wrenched by an overheated housing 
market sparked by loose credit, followed by a financial 
crisis in which the conduits of capital nearly froze up, 
it is time to construct a financial system more condu-
cive to a more comfortable and sustainable economic 
temperature.
An independent Fed, equipped with the authority 
to responsibly execute monetary policy and aided by a 
strong supervisory and regulatory arm, is the most ef-
fective weapon we have to meet the need for increased 
stability and contain the dangerous spillovers that 
threaten the economy in periods of distress. Now that 
policymakers have pulled our economy back from the 
abyss, it is time to apply the lessons we have learned 
and put the Fed’s abilities to best use.
Now that policymakers have 
pulled our economy back from 
the abyss, it is time to apply 
the lessons we have learned 
and put the Fed’s abilities 
to best use.
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Management’s Report on Internal Control 
Over Financial Reporting
April 21, 2010 
To the Board of Directors of the 
Federal Reserve Bank of Dallas:
The management of the Federal Reserve Bank of Dallas (“FRBD”) is responsible for the preparation  
and fair presentation of the Statement of Condition, Statements of Income and Comprehensive 
Income, and Statement of Changes in Capital as of December 31, 2009 (the “Financial Statements”). 
The Financial Statements have been prepared in conformity with the accounting principles, policies, 
and practices established by the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System as set forth in 
the Financial Accounting Manual for the Federal Reserve Banks (“Manual”), and as such, include 
some amounts that are based on management judgments and estimates. To our knowledge, the 
Financial Statements are, in all material respects, fairly presented in conformity with the accounting 
principles, policies, and practices documented in the Manual and include all disclosures necessary 
for such fair presentation.
The management of the FRBD is responsible for establishing and maintaining effective internal 
control over financial reporting as it relates to the Financial Statements. Such internal control is  
designed to provide reasonable assurance to management and to the Board of Directors regarding 
the preparation of the Financial Statements in accordance with the Manual. Internal control contains 
self-monitoring mechanisms, including, but not limited to, divisions of responsibility and a code of 
conduct. Once identified, any material deficiencies in internal control are reported to management 
and appropriate corrective measures are implemented.
Even effective internal control, no matter how well designed, has inherent limitations, including the 
possibility of human error, and therefore can provide only reasonable assurance with respect to the 
preparation of reliable financial statements. Also, projections of any evaluation of effectiveness to 
future periods are subject to the risk that controls may become inadequate because of changes in 
conditions, or that the degree of compliance with the policies or procedures may deteriorate. 
The management of the FRBD assessed its internal control over financial reporting reflected in  
the Financial Statements, based upon the criteria established in the Internal Control—Integrated 
Framework issued by the Committee of Sponsoring Organizations of the Treadway Commission. 
Based on this assessment, we believe that the FRBD maintained effective internal control over 
financial reporting as it relates to the Financial Statements.
Federal Reserve Bank of Dallas
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Report of Independent Auditors 
To the Board of Governors of the Federal  
Reserve System and the Board of Directors  
of the Federal Reserve Bank of Dallas:
We have audited the accompanying statements of condition of the Federal Reserve Bank of Dallas 
(“FRB  Dallas”)  as  of  December  31,  2009  and  2008  and  the  related  statements  of  income  and 
comprehensive income, and changes in capital for the years then ended, which have been prepared 
in conformity with accounting principles established by the Board of Governors of the Federal 
Reserve System. We also have audited the internal control over financial reporting of FRB Dallas 
as of December 31, 2009, based on criteria established in Internal Control—Integrated Framework 
issued by the Committee of Sponsoring Organizations of the Treadway Commission. FRB Dallas’s 
management is responsible for these financial statements, for maintaining effective internal control 
over financial reporting, and for its assessment of the effectiveness of internal control over financial 
reporting, included in the accompanying Management’s Report on Internal Control over Financial 
Reporting. Our responsibility is to express an opinion on these financial statements and an opinion 
on FRB Dallas’s internal control over financial reporting based on our audits.  
We conducted our audits in accordance with generally accepted auditing standards as established by 
the Auditing Standards Board (United States) and in accordance with the auditing standards of the 
Public Company Accounting Oversight Board (United States). Those standards require that we plan 
and perform the audit to obtain reasonable assurance about whether the financial statements are free of 
material misstatement and whether effective internal control over financial reporting was maintained in 
all material respects. Our audits of the financial statements included examining, on a test basis, evidence 
supporting the amounts and disclosures in the financial statements, assessing the accounting principles 
used and significant estimates made by management, and evaluating the overall financial statement 
presentation. Our audit of internal control over financial reporting included obtaining an understanding 
of internal control over financial reporting, assessing the risk that a material weakness exists, and testing 
and evaluating the design and operating effectiveness of internal control based on the assessed risk. Our 
audits also included performing such other procedures as we considered necessary in the circumstances.  
We believe that our audits provide a reasonable basis for our opinions.
FRB  Dallas’s  internal  control  over  financial  reporting  is  a  process  designed  by,  or  under  the  
supervision  of,  FRB  Dallas’s  principal  executive  and  principal  financial  officers,  or  persons  
performing  similar  functions,  and  effected  by  FRB  Dallas’s  board  of  directors,  management,  and 
other  personnel  to  provide  reasonable  assurance  regarding  the  reliability  of  financial  reporting  
and the preparation of financial statements for external purposes in accordance with the accounting 
principles established by the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System. FRB Dallas’s internal 
control over financial reporting includes those policies and procedures that (1) pertain to the maintenance 
of records that, in reasonable detail, accurately and fairly reflect the transactions and dispositions of the 
assets of FRB Dallas; (2) provide reasonable assurance that transactions are recorded as necessary to 
permit preparation of financial statements in accordance with the accounting principles established by 
the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, and that receipts and expenditures of FRB Dallas 
are being made only in accordance with authorizations of management and directors of FRB Dallas; and 
(3) provide reasonable assurance regarding prevention or timely detection of unauthorized acquisition, 
use, or disposition of FRB Dallas’s assets that could have a material effect on the financial statements.2009 Annual Report • Financials     25
 Report of Independent Auditors (continued)
Because  of  the  inherent  limitations  of  internal  control  over  financial  reporting,  including  the 
possibility  of  collusion  or  improper  management  override  of  controls,  material  misstatements 
due to error or fraud may not be prevented or detected on a timely basis. Also, projections of any 
evaluation of the effectiveness of the internal control over financial reporting to future periods are 
subject to the risk that the controls may become inadequate because of changes in conditions, or 
that the degree of compliance with the policies or procedures may deteriorate. 
As  described  in  Note  4  to  the  financial  statements,  FRB  Dallas  has  prepared  these  financial 
statements in conformity with accounting principles established by the Board of Governors of the 
Federal Reserve System, as set forth in the Financial Accounting Manual for Federal Reserve Banks, 
which is a comprehensive basis of accounting other than accounting principles generally accepted 
in the United States of America.  The effects on such financial statements of the differences between 
the accounting principles established by the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System and 
accounting principles generally accepted in the United States of America are also described in Note 4. 
In our opinion, such financial statements present fairly, in all material respects, the financial position 
of FRB Dallas as of December 31, 2009 and 2008, and the results of its operations for the years then 
ended, on the basis of accounting described in Note 4. Also, in our opinion, FRB Dallas maintained, 
in  all  material  respects,  effective  internal  control  over  financial  reporting  as  of  December  31, 
2009, based on the criteria established in Internal Control—Integrated Framework issued by the 
Committee of Sponsoring Organizations of the Treadway Commission.
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Statements of Condition (in millions)
December 31, 2009 December 31, 2008
Assets
Gold certificates $ 621 $ 636
Special drawing rights certificates 282 98
Coin 214 180
Items in process of collection 33 152
Loans to depository institutions 392 5,027
System Open Market Account:
Securities purchased under agreements to resell — 3,318
Treasury securities, net 38,970 19,971
Government-sponsored enterprise debt securities, net 8,092 860
Federal agency and government-sponsored enterprise mortgage-
backed securities, net 44,432 —
Investments denominated in foreign currencies 325 489
Central bank liquidity swaps 132 10,908
Accrued interest receivable 610 261
Interdistrict settlement account — 11,155
Bank premises and equipment, net 276 278
Other assets 37 38
total assets $ 94,416 $ 53,371
LiAbiLities AnD CApitAL
Liabilities
Federal Reserve notes outstanding, net $ 49,642 $ 35,121
System Open Market Account: 
Securities sold under agreements to repurchase 3,758 3,665
Other liabilities 29 —
Deposits:
Depository institutions 22,826 13,533
Other deposits 1 1
Deferred credit items 109 296
Accrued interest on Federal Reserve notes 51 103
Interdistrict settlement account 17,174 —
Interest due to depository institutions 2 2
Accrued benefit costs 103 92
Other liabilities 15 16
total liabilities 93,710 52,829
Capital
Capital paid-in 353 271
Surplus (including accumulated other comprehensive loss of $18 million  
and $15 million at December 31, 2009 and 2008, respectively) 353 271
total capital 706 542
total liabilities and capital $ 94,416 $ 53,371
The accompanying notes are an integral part of these financial statements.2009 Annual Report • Financials     27
Statements of Income and Comprehensive Income (in millions)
For the Years ended
December 31, 2009 December 31, 2008
interest inCome
Loans to depository institutions $ 10 $ 57
System Open Market Account:
Securities purchased under agreements to resell 1 80
Treasury securities 1,073 1,082
Government-sponsored enterprise debt securities 97 4
Federal agency and government-sponsored enterprise mortgage-
backed securities 977 —
Investments denominated in foreign currencies 4 12
Central bank liquidity swaps 32 70
total interest income 2,194 1,305
interest expense
System Open Market Account:
Securities sold under agreements to repurchase 4 31
Depository institutions deposits 36 9
Total interest expense 40 40
net interest income 2,154 1,265
non-interest inCome (Loss)
System Open Market Account:
Treasury securities gains — 162
Federal agency and government-sponsored enterprise mortgage-
backed securities gains, net 44 —
Foreign currency (losses) gains, net (3) 22
Compensation received for services provided 28 43
Reimbursable services to government agencies 14 15
Other income 10 35
Total non-interest income 93 277
operAting expenses
Salaries and other benefits 126 119
Occupancy expense 25 25
Equipment expense 12 13
Assessments by the Board of Governors 33 25
Other expenses 29 43
total operating expenses 225 225
net income prior to distribution 2,022 1,317
Change in funded status of benefit plans (3) —
Comprehensive income prior to distribution $ 2,019 $ 1,317
Distribution oF Comprehensive inCome
Dividends paid to member banks $ 17 $ 17
Transferred to (from) surplus and change in accumulated other 
comprehensive loss 82 (92)
Payments to Treasury as interest on Federal Reserve notes 1,920 1,392
Total distribution $ 2,019 $ 1,317
The accompanying notes are an integral part of these financial statements.28     FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF DALLAS • 2009 Annual Report
Statements of Changes in Capital for the Years Ended  














bALAnCe At JAnuArY 1, 2008
(7,268,613 shares)
$  363 $  378 $  (15) $  363 $  726
Net change in capital stock redeemed 
(1,849,175 shares)   (92)   —   —   —   (92)
Transferred from surplus and change in  
accumulated other comprehensive loss
  —   (92)   —   (92)   (92)
bALAnCe At DeCember 31, 2008
(5,419,438 shares)
$  271 $  286 $  (15) $  271 $  542
Net change in capital stock issued 
(1,630,658 shares)   82   —   —   —   82
Transferred to surplus and change in  
accumulated other comprehensive loss   —   85   (3)   82   82
bALAnCe At DeCember 31, 2009
(7,050,096 shares)
$  353 $  371 $  (18) $   353 $  706
The accompanying notes are an integral part of these financial statements.Financials
Notes to Financial Statements
1. struCture
The Federal Reserve Bank of Dallas (“Bank”) is part of the Federal 
Reserve System (“System”) and is one of the 12 Federal Reserve Banks 
(“Reserve Banks”) created by Congress under the Federal Reserve Act 
of 1913 (“Federal Reserve Act”), which established the central bank 
of the United States. The Reserve Banks are chartered by the federal 
government and possess a unique set of governmental, corporate, 
and  central  bank  characteristics.  The  Bank  and  its  branches  in  El 
Paso, Houston, and San Antonio serve the Eleventh Federal Reserve 
District, which includes Texas and portions of Louisiana and New 
Mexico. 
In  accordance  with  the  Federal  Reserve  Act,  supervision  and 
control of the Bank is exercised by a board of directors. The Federal 
Reserve Act specifies the composition of the board of directors for 
each of the Reserve Banks. Each board is composed of nine members 
serving three-year terms: three directors, including those designated 
as chairman and deputy chairman, are appointed by the Board of 
Governors of the Federal Reserve System (“Board of Governors”) to 
represent the public, and six directors are elected by member banks. 
Banks that are members of the System include all national banks and 
any state-chartered banks that apply and are approved for member-
ship. Member banks are divided into three classes according to size. 
Member banks in each class elect one director representing member 
banks and one representing the public. In any election of directors, 
each member bank receives one vote, regardless of the number of 
shares of Reserve Bank stock it holds.
In addition to the 12 Reserve Banks, the System also consists, 
in  part,  of  the  Board  of  Governors  and  the  Federal  Open  Market 
Committee (“FOMC”). The Board of Governors, an independent fed-
eral agency, is charged by the Federal Reserve Act with a number of 
specific duties, including general supervision over the Reserve Banks. 
The FOMC is composed of members of the Board of Governors, the 
president of the Federal Reserve Bank of New York (“FRBNY”), and, on 
a rotating basis, four other Reserve Bank presidents. 
2. operAtions AnD serviCes
The Reserve Banks perform a variety of services and operations. 
These functions include participating in formulating and conduct-
ing monetary policy; participating in the payments system, including 
large-dollar  transfers  of  funds,  automated  clearinghouse  (“ACH”) 
operations,  and  check  collection;  distributing  coin  and  currency; 
performing  fiscal  agency  functions  for  the  U.S.  Department  of  the 
Treasury  (“Treasury”),  certain  federal  agencies,  and  other  entities; 
serving as the federal government’s bank; providing short-term loans 
to depository institutions; providing loans to individuals, partnerships, 
and  corporations  in  unusual  and  exigent  circumstances;  serving 
consumers and communities by providing educational materials and 
information regarding financial consumer protection rights and laws 
and information on community development programs and activi-
ties; and supervising bank holding companies, state member banks, 
and U.S. offices of foreign banking organizations. Certain services are 
provided to foreign and international monetary authorities, primarily 
by the FRBNY.
The  FOMC,  in  conducting  monetary  policy,  establishes  policy 
regarding domestic open market operations, oversees these opera-
tions, and annually issues authorizations and directives to the FRBNY 
to execute transactions. The FOMC authorizes and directs the FRBNY 
to conduct operations in domestic markets, including the direct pur-
chase and sale of Treasury securities, federal agency and government-
sponsored enterprise (“GSE”) debt securities, federal agency and GSE 
mortgage-backed securities (“MBS”), the purchase of these securities 
under agreements to resell, and the sale of these securities under 
agreements to repurchase. The FRBNY executes these transactions 
at the direction of the FOMC and holds the resulting securities and 
agreements in a portfolio known as the System Open Market Account 
(“SOMA”). The FRBNY is authorized to lend the Treasury securities 
and federal agency and GSE debt securities that are held in the SOMA.  
In addition to authorizing and directing operations in the domestic 
securities market, the FOMC authorizes the FRBNY to execute opera-
tions in foreign markets in order to counter disorderly conditions in 
exchange markets or to meet other needs specified by the FOMC to 
carry out the System’s central bank responsibilities. Specifically, the 
FOMC authorizes and directs the FRBNY to hold balances of, and to 
execute spot and forward foreign exchange and securities contracts 
for, 14 foreign currencies and to invest such foreign currency holdings, 
while maintaining adequate liquidity. The FRBNY is authorized and 
directed by the FOMC to maintain reciprocal currency arrangements 
(“FX swaps”) with two central banks and to “warehouse” foreign cur-
rencies for the Treasury and the Exchange Stabilization Fund (“ESF”). 
The FRBNY is also authorized and directed by the FOMC to maintain 
U.S.  dollar  currency  liquidity  swap  arrangements  with  14  central 
banks. The FOMC has also authorized the FRBNY to maintain foreign 
currency liquidity swap arrangements with four foreign central banks. 
Although the Reserve Banks are separate legal entities, they col-
laborate in the delivery of certain services to achieve greater efficiency 
and  effectiveness.  This  collaboration  takes  the  form  of  centralized 
operations and product or function offices that have responsibility 
for the delivery of certain services on behalf of the Reserve Banks. 
Various operational and management models are used and are sup-
ported by service agreements between the Reserve Banks. In some 
cases, costs incurred by a Reserve Bank for services provided to other 
Reserve Banks are not shared; in other cases, the Reserve Banks are 
reimbursed for costs incurred in providing services to other Reserve 
Banks. Major services provided by the Bank on behalf of the System 
and for which the costs were not reimbursed by the other Reserve 
Banks  include  Check  Automation  Services;  National  Examination 
Data  System;  Desktop  Services  Center;  Payment  Application 
Modernization; Lawson Central Business Administration Function; 
Accounts, Risk and Credit System; and Go Direct®. 
3. FinAnCiAL stAbiLitY ACtivities
The  Reserve  Banks  have  implemented  the  following  programs 
that support the liquidity of financial institutions and foster improved 
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expanded open market operations and support for mortgage-
related securities
The  Single-Tranche  Open  Market  Operation  Program  allows 
primary dealers to initiate a series of 28-day term repurchase transac-
tions while pledging Treasury securities, federal agency and GSE debt 
securities, and federal agency and GSE MBS as collateral.
The federal agency and GSE Debt Securities and MBS Purchase 
Program provides support to the mortgage and housing markets and 
fosters improved conditions in financial markets. Under this program, 
the FRBNY purchases housing-related GSE debt securities and federal 
agency and GSE MBS. Purchases of housing-related GSE debt securi-
ties began in November 2008, and purchases of federal agency and 
GSE MBS began in January 2009. The FRBNY is authorized to pur-
chase up to $200 billion in fixed-rate, noncallable GSE debt securities 
and up to $1.25 trillion in fixed-rate federal agency and GSE MBS. The 
activities of both of these programs are allocated to the other Reserve 
Banks.
Central bank Liquidity swaps
The FOMC authorized and directed the FRBNY to establish cen-
tral bank liquidity swap arrangements, which may be structured as 
either U.S. dollar liquidity or foreign currency liquidity swap arrange-
ments. 
U.S. dollar liquidity swap arrangements were authorized with 14 
foreign central banks to provide liquidity in U.S. dollars to overseas 
markets. Such arrangements were authorized with the following cen-
tral banks: the Reserve Bank of Australia, the Banco Central do Brasil, 
the Bank of Canada, Danmarks Nationalbank, the Bank of England, 
the European Central Bank, the Bank of Japan, the Bank of Korea, the 
Banco de México, the Reserve Bank of New Zealand, Norges Bank, 
the Monetary Authority of Singapore, the Sveriges Riksbank, and the 
Swiss National Bank. The maximum amount that could be drawn 
under these swap arrangements varied by central bank. The autho-
rization for these swap arrangements expired on February 1, 2010. 
Foreign  currency  liquidity  swap  arrangements  provided  the 
Reserve Banks with the capacity to offer foreign currency liquidity to 
U.S. depository institutions. Such arrangements were authorized with 
the Bank of England, the European Central Bank, the Bank of Japan, 
and the Swiss National Bank. The maximum amount that could be 
drawn under the swap arrangements varied by central bank. The autho-
rization for these swap arrangements expired on February 1, 2010. 
Lending to Depository institutions
 The Term Auction Facility (“TAF”) promotes the efficient dissem-
ination of liquidity by providing term funds to depository institutions. 
Under the TAF, Reserve Banks auction term funds to depository insti-
tutions against any collateral eligible to secure primary, secondary, 
and seasonal credit less a margin, which is a reduction in the assigned 
collateral value that is intended to provide the Banks additional credit 
protection. All depository institutions that are considered to be in 
generally sound financial condition by their Reserve Bank and that 
are eligible to borrow under the primary credit program are eligible 
to participate in TAF auctions. All loans must be collateralized to the 
satisfaction of the Reserve Banks.
Lending to primary Dealers
The Term Securities Lending Facility (“TSLF”) promoted liquid-
ity in the financing markets for Treasury securities. Under the TSLF, 
the FRBNY could lend up to an aggregate amount of $200 billion of 
Treasury securities held in the SOMA to primary dealers secured for 
a term of 28 days. Securities were lent to primary dealers through 
a  competitive  single-price  auction  and  were  collateralized,  less  a 
margin, by a pledge of other securities, including Treasury securities, 
municipal securities, federal agency and GSE MBS, nonagency AAA/
Aaa-rated private-label residential MBS, and asset-backed securities 
(“ABS”). The authorization for the TSLF expired on February 1, 2010. 
The Term Securities Lending Facility Options Program (“TOP”) 
offered primary dealers, through a competitive single-price auction, to 
purchase an option to draw upon short-term, fixed-rate TSLF loans in 
exchange for eligible collateral. The program enhanced the effective-
ness of the TSLF by ensuring additional liquidity during periods of 
heightened collateral market pressures, such as around quarter-end 
dates. The program was suspended effective with the maturity of the 
June 2009 TOP options, and the program authorization expired on 
February 1, 2010. 
other Lending Facilities
The  Asset-Backed  Commercial  Paper  Money  Market  Mutual 
Fund  Liquidity  Facility  (“AMLF”)  provided  funding  to  depository 
institutions and bank holding companies to finance the purchase of 
eligible high-quality asset-backed commercial paper (“ABCP”) from 
money market mutual funds. The program assisted money market 
mutual funds that hold such paper to meet the demands for investor 
redemptions and to foster liquidity in the ABCP market and money 
markets more generally. The Federal Reserve Bank of Boston (“FRBB”) 
administered the AMLF and was authorized to extend these loans to 
eligible borrowers on behalf of the other Reserve Banks. All loans 
extended under the AMLF were nonrecourse and were recorded as 
assets by the FRBB, and if the borrowing institution settles to a deposi-
tory account in the Eleventh Federal Reserve District, the funds were 
credited to the depository institution account and settled between the 
Reserve Banks through the interdistrict settlement account. The credit 
risk related to the AMLF was assumed by the FRBB. The authorization 
for the AMLF expired on February 1, 2010. 
4. signiFiCAnt ACCounting poLiCies
Accounting  principles  for  entities  with  the  unique  powers  and 
responsibilities of a nation’s central bank have not been formulated 
by accounting standard-setting bodies. The Board of Governors has 
developed specialized accounting principles and practices that it con-
siders to be appropriate for the nature and function of a central bank. 
These accounting principles and practices are documented in the 
Financial Accounting Manual for Federal Reserve Banks (“Financial 
Accounting  Manual”  or  “FAM”),  which  is  issued  by  the  Board  of 
Governors.  The  Reserve  Banks  are  required  to  adopt  and  apply 
accounting policies and practices that are consistent with the FAM, 
and the financial statements have been prepared in accordance with 
the FAM.Financials
Limited differences exist between the accounting principles and 
practices in the FAM and generally accepted accounting principles in 
the United States (“GAAP”), primarily due to the unique nature of the 
Bank’s powers and responsibilities as part of the nation’s central bank.  
The primary difference is the presentation of all SOMA securities hold-
ings at amortized cost rather than the fair value presentation required 
by  GAAP.  Treasury  securities,  GSE  debt  securities,  federal  agency 
and GSE MBS, and investments denominated in foreign currencies 
comprising the SOMA are recorded at cost, on a settlement-date basis 
rather than the trade-date basis required by GAAP. The cost basis of 
Treasury securities, GSE debt securities, and foreign government debt 
instruments is adjusted for amortization of premiums or accretion 
of discounts on a straight-line basis. Amortized cost more appropri-
ately reflects the Bank’s securities holdings given the System’s unique 
responsibility  to  conduct  monetary  policy.  Accounting  for  these 
securities on a settlement-date basis more appropriately reflects the 
timing of the transaction’s effect on the quantity of reserves in the 
banking system. Although the application of fair value measurements 
to the securities holdings may result in values substantially above or 
below their carrying values, these unrealized changes in value have no 
direct effect on the quantity of reserves available to the banking sys-
tem or on the prospects for future Bank earnings or capital. Both the 
domestic and foreign components of the SOMA portfolio may involve 
transactions that result in gains or losses when holdings are sold prior 
to maturity. Decisions regarding securities and foreign currency trans-
actions, including their purchase and sale, are motivated by monetary 
policy objectives rather than profit. Accordingly, fair values, earnings, 
and gains or losses resulting from the sale of such securities and cur-
rencies are incidental to the open market operations and do not moti-
vate decisions related to policy or open market activities. 
In addition, the Bank has elected not to present a Statement of 
Cash Flows because the liquidity and cash position of the Bank are 
not a primary concern given the Reserve Banks’ unique powers and 
responsibilities. Other information regarding the Bank’s activities is 
provided in, or may be derived from, the Statements of Condition, 
Income and Comprehensive Income, and Changes in Capital. There 
are no other significant differences between the policies outlined in 
the FAM and GAAP. 
Preparing the financial statements in conformity with the FAM 
requires management to make certain estimates and assumptions 
that affect the reported amounts of assets and liabilities, the disclosure 
of contingent assets and liabilities at the date of the financial state-
ments, and the reported amounts of income and expenses during 
the reporting period. Actual results could differ from those estimates. 
Certain amounts relating to the prior year have been reclassified to 
conform to the current-year presentation. Unique accounts and sig-
nificant accounting policies are explained below.
a. gold and special Drawing rights Certificates
The Secretary of the Treasury is authorized to issue gold and spe-
cial drawing rights (“SDR”) certificates to the Reserve Banks.
Payment for the gold certificates by the Reserve Banks is made by 
crediting equivalent amounts in dollars into the account established 
for the Treasury. The gold certificates held by the Reserve Banks are 
required to be backed by the gold of the Treasury. The Treasury may 
reacquire the gold certificates at any time, and the Reserve Banks must 
deliver them to the Treasury. At such time, the Treasury’s account is 
charged, and the Reserve Banks’ gold certificate accounts are reduced. 
The value of gold for purposes of backing the gold certificates is set by 
law at $42 2/9 per fine troy ounce. The Board of Governors allocates 
the gold certificates among the Reserve Banks once a year based on 
the average Federal Reserve notes outstanding in each Reserve Bank. 
SDR certificates are issued by the International Monetary Fund 
(the “Fund”) to its members in proportion to each member’s quota in 
the Fund at the time of issuance. SDR certificates serve as a supple-
ment to international monetary reserves and may be transferred from 
one national monetary authority to another. Under the law providing 
for U.S. participation in the SDR system, the Secretary of the Treasury 
is authorized to issue SDR certificates to the Reserve Banks. When 
SDR certificates are issued to the Reserve Banks, equivalent amounts 
in U.S. dollars are credited to the account established for the Treasury 
and the Reserve Banks’ SDR certificate accounts are increased. The 
Reserve Banks are required to purchase SDR certificates, at the direc-
tion of the Treasury, for the purpose of financing SDR acquisitions 
or for financing exchange stabilization operations. At the time SDR 
transactions occur, the Board of Governors allocates SDR certificate 
transactions  among  the  Reserve  Banks  based  upon  each  Reserve 
Bank’s Federal Reserve notes outstanding at the end of the preced-
ing year. There were no SDR transactions in 2008, and in 2009 the 
Treasury issued $3 billion in SDR certificates to the Reserve Banks, of 
which $184 million was allocated to the Bank.
b. Loans to Depository institutions
Loans are reported at their outstanding principal balances, and 
interest income is recognized on an accrual basis. 
Loans  are  impaired  when,  based  on  current  information  and 
events, it is probable that the Bank will not receive the principal or 
interest that is due in accordance with the contractual terms of the 
loan agreement. Loans are evaluated to determine whether an allow-
ance for loan loss is required. The Bank has developed procedures 
for assessing the adequacy of any allowance for loan losses using 
all available information to reflect the assessment of credit risk. This 
assessment includes monitoring information obtained from banking 
supervisors, borrowers, and other sources to assess the credit condi-
tion of the borrowers and, as appropriate, evaluating collateral values 
for  each  program.  Generally,  the  Bank  discontinues  recognizing 
interest income on impaired loans until the borrower’s repayment 
performance demonstrates principal and interest will be received in 
accordance with the term of the loan agreement. If the Bank discon-
tinues recording interest on an impaired loan, cash payments are first 
applied to principal until the loan balance is reduced to zero; sub-
sequent payments are applied as recoveries of amounts previously 
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c. securities purchased under Agreements to resell, securities 
sold under Agreements to repurchase, and securities Lending
The FRBNY may engage in purchases of securities with primary 
dealers under agreements to resell (“repurchase transactions”). These 
repurchase  transactions  are  typically  executed  through  a  tri-party 
arrangement (“tri-party transactions”). Tri-party transactions are con-
ducted with two commercial custodial banks that manage the clear-
ing, settlement, and pledging of collateral. The collateral pledged must 
exceed the principal amount of the transaction. Acceptable collateral 
under tri-party repurchase transactions primarily includes Treasury 
securities; pass-through mortgage securities of Fannie Mae, Freddie 
Mac, and Ginnie Mae; STRIP Treasury securities; and “stripped” secu-
rities of federal agencies. The tri-party transactions are accounted for 
as financing transactions with the associated interest income accrued 
over the life of the transaction. Repurchase transactions are report-
ed at their contractual amount as “System Open Market Account: 
Securities purchased under agreements to resell” in the Statements of 
Condition and the related accrued interest receivable is reported as a 
component of “Accrued interest receivables.” 
The FRBNY may engage in sales of securities with primary dealers 
under agreements to repurchase (“reverse repurchase transactions”). 
These reverse repurchase transactions may be executed through a 
tri-party  arrangement,  similar  to  repurchase  transactions.  Reverse 
repurchase transactions may also be executed with foreign official 
and  international  accounts.  Reverse  repurchase  transactions  are 
accounted for as financing transactions, and the associated interest 
expense is recognized over the life of the transaction. These transac-
tions are reported at their contractual amounts in the Statements of 
Condition, and the related accrued interest payable is reported as a 
component of “Other liabilities.” 
Treasury securities and GSE debt securities held in the SOMA 
are lent to primary dealers to facilitate the effective functioning of the 
domestic securities market. Overnight securities lending transactions 
are  fully  collateralized  by  other  Treasury  securities.  TSLF  transac-
tions are fully collateralized with investment-grade debt securities, 
collateral eligible for tri-party repurchase agreements arranged by the 
FRBNY, or both. The collateral taken in both overnight and term secu-
rities lending transactions is in excess of the fair value of the securities 
lent. The FRBNY charges the primary dealer a fee for borrowing secu-
rities, and these fees are reported as a component of “Other income.” 
In addition, TOP fees are reported as a component of “Other income.”
Activity  related  to  securities  purchased  under  agreements  to 
resell, securities sold under agreements to repurchase, and securities 
lending is allocated to each of the Reserve Banks on a percentage 
basis derived from an annual settlement of the interdistrict settlement 
account that occurs in April each year. The settlement also equalizes 
Reserve Bank gold certificate holdings to Federal Reserve notes out-
standing in each District.
d. treasury securities; government-sponsored enterprise Debt 
securities; Federal Agency and government-sponsored enterprise 
mortgage-backed securities; investments Denominated in Foreign 
Currencies; and Warehousing Agreements 
Interest  income  on  Treasury  securities,  GSE  debt  securities, 
and investments denominated in foreign currencies comprising the 
SOMA is accrued on a straight-line basis. Interest income on fed-
eral agency and GSE MBS is accrued using the interest method and 
includes amortization of premiums, accretion of discounts, and pay-
down gains or losses. Paydown gains or losses result from scheduled 
payment and prepayment of principal and represent the difference 
between the principal amount and the carrying value of the related 
security. Gains and losses resulting from sales of securities are deter-
mined by specific issue based on average cost.  
In addition to outright purchases of federal agency and GSE MBS 
that are held in the SOMA, the FRBNY enters into dollar roll transac-
tions  (“dollar  rolls”),  which  primarily  involve  an  initial  transaction 
to purchase or sell “to be announced” (“TBA”) MBS combined with 
an  agreement  to  sell  or  purchase  TBA  MBS  on  a  specified  future 
date.  The FRBNY’s participation in the dollar roll market furthers the 
MBS Purchase Program goal of providing support to the mortgage 
and housing markets and fostering improved conditions in financial 
markets.    The  FRBNY  accounts  for  outstanding  commitments  to 
sell or purchase TBA MBS on a settlement-date basis. Based on the 
terms of the FRBNY dollar roll transactions, transfers of MBS upon 
settlement of the initial TBA MBS transactions are accounted for as 
purchases or sales in accordance with FASB ASC Topic 860 (ASC 
860),  Accounting  for  Transfers  of  Financial  Assets  and  Repurchase 
Financing Transactions, (previously SFAS 140), and the related out-
standing commitments are accounted for as sales or purchases upon 
settlement.  
Activity related to Treasury securities, GSE debt securities, and fed-
eral agency and GSE MBS, including the premiums, discounts, and real-
ized gains and losses, is allocated to each Reserve Bank on a percentage 
basis derived from an annual settlement of the interdistrict settlement 
account that occurs in April of each year. The settlement also equalizes 
Reserve Bank gold certificate holdings to Federal Reserve notes out-
standing in each District. Activity related to investments denominated 
in foreign currencies, including the premiums, discounts, and realized 
and  unrealized  gains  and  losses,  is  allocated  to  each  Reserve  Bank 
based on the ratio of each Reserve Bank’s capital and surplus to aggre-
gate capital and surplus at the preceding December 31.
Foreign-currency-denominated assets are revalued daily at current 
foreign currency market exchange rates in order to report these assets 
in U.S. dollars. Realized and unrealized gains and losses on investments 
denominated in foreign currencies are reported as “Foreign currency 
gains or losses, net” in the Statements of Income and Comprehensive 
Income.
Warehousing is an arrangement under which the FOMC agrees 
to exchange, at the request of the Treasury, U.S. dollars for foreign cur-
rencies held by the Treasury or ESF over a limited period of time. The 
purpose of the warehousing facility is to supplement the U.S. dollar 
resources of the Treasury and ESF for financing purchases of foreign 
currencies and related international operations.Financials
Warehousing agreements are designated as held-for-trading pur-
poses and are valued daily at current market exchange rates. Activity 
related to these agreements is allocated to each Reserve Bank based on 
the ratio of each Reserve Bank’s capital and surplus to aggregate capital 
and surplus at the preceding December 31.
e. Central bank Liquidity swaps
Central bank liquidity swaps, which are transacted between the 
FRBNY and a foreign central bank, may be structured as either U.S. 
dollar liquidity or foreign currency liquidity swap arrangements.  
Activity related to U.S. dollar and foreign currency swap transac-
tions, including the related income and expense, is allocated to each 
Reserve Bank based on the ratio of each Reserve Bank’s capital and 
surplus to aggregate capital and surplus at the preceding December 
31.  Similar  to  investments  denominated  in  foreign  currencies,  the 
foreign currency amounts associated with these central bank liquidity 
swap arrangements are revalued at current foreign currency market 
exchange rates. 
U.S. dollar liquidity swaps 
At the initiation of each U.S. dollar liquidity swap transaction, the 
foreign central bank transfers a specified amount of its currency to a 
restricted account for the FRBNY in exchange for U.S. dollars at the 
prevailing market exchange rate. Concurrent with this transaction, 
the FRBNY and the foreign central bank agree to a second transaction 
that obligates the foreign central bank to return the U.S. dollars and 
the FRBNY to return the foreign currency on a specified future date at 
the same exchange rate as the initial transaction. The Bank’s allocated 
portion of the foreign currency amounts that the FRBNY acquires 
is reported as “Central bank liquidity swaps” on the Statements of 
Condition.  Because  the  swap  transaction  will  be  unwound  at  the 
same U.S. dollar amount and exchange rate that was used in the initial 
transaction, the recorded value of the foreign currency amounts is not 
affected by changes in the market exchange rate.
The foreign central bank compensates the FRBNY based on the 
foreign currency amounts held for the FRBNY. The FRBNY recognizes 
compensation during the term of the swap transaction and reports it 
as “Interest income: Central bank liquidity swaps” in the Statements of 
Income and Comprehensive Income. 
Foreign currency liquidity swaps 
At the initiation of each foreign currency liquidity swap transac-
tion, the FRBNY will transfer, at the prevailing market exchange rate, 
a specified amount of U.S. dollars to an account for the foreign central 
bank  in  exchange  for  its  currency.  The  foreign  currency  amount 
received is reported as a liability by the Bank. Concurrent with this 
transaction, the FRBNY and the foreign central bank agree to a second 
transaction that obligates the FRBNY to return the foreign currency 
and the foreign central bank to return the U.S. dollars on a specified 
future date. The FRBNY compensates the foreign central bank based 
on the foreign currency transferred to the FRBNY. For each foreign 
currency swap transaction with a foreign central bank it is anticipated 
that the FRBNY will enter into a corresponding transaction with a U.S. 
depository institution in order to provide foreign currency liquidity 
to that institution. No foreign currency liquidity swap transactions 
occurred in 2008 or 2009. 
f. interdistrict settlement Account
At the close of business each day, each Reserve Bank aggregates 
the payments due to or from other Reserve Banks. These payments 
result from transactions between the Reserve Banks and transactions 
that involve depository institution accounts held by other Reserve 
Banks,  such  as  Fedwire  funds  and  securities  transfers  and  check 
and ACH transactions. The cumulative net amount due to or from 
the other Reserve Banks is reflected in the “Interdistrict settlement 
account” in the Statements of Condition.
g. bank premises, equipment, and software
Bank premises and equipment are stated at cost less accumulated 
depreciation. Depreciation is calculated on a straight-line basis over 
the estimated useful lives of the assets, which range from two to 50 
years. Major alterations, renovations, and improvements are capital-
ized at cost as additions to the asset accounts and are depreciated 
over the remaining useful life of the asset or, if appropriate, over the 
unique  useful  life  of  the  alteration,  renovation,  or  improvement. 
Maintenance, repairs, and minor replacements are charged to operat-
ing expense in the year incurred. 
Costs incurred for software during the application development 
stage, whether developed internally or acquired for internal use, are 
capitalized based on the purchase cost and the cost of direct services 
and materials associated with designing, coding, installing, and testing 
the software. Capitalized software costs are amortized on a straight-
line basis over the estimated useful lives of the software applications, 
which range from two to five years. Maintenance costs related to soft-
ware are charged to expense in the year incurred.
Capitalized  assets,  including  software,  buildings,  leasehold 
improvements, furniture, and equipment, are impaired, and an adjust-
ment is recorded when events or changes in circumstances indicate 
that the carrying amount of assets or asset groups is not recoverable 
and significantly exceeds the assets’ fair value.
h. Federal reserve notes
Federal Reserve notes are the circulating currency of the United 
States. These notes, which are identified as issued to a specific Reserve 
Bank, must be fully collateralized. Assets eligible to be pledged as col-
lateral security include all of the Bank’s assets. The collateral value is 
equal to the book value of the collateral tendered with the exception of 
securities, for which the collateral value is equal to the par value of the 
securities tendered. The par value of securities pledged for securities 
sold under agreements to repurchase is deducted. 
The Board of Governors may, at any time, call upon a Reserve 
Bank for additional security to adequately collateralize the outstand-
ing Federal Reserve notes. To satisfy the obligation to provide suf-
ficient collateral for outstanding Federal Reserve notes, the Reserve 
Banks have entered into an agreement that provides for certain assets 
of the Reserve Banks to be jointly pledged as collateral for the Federal 
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lateral is insufficient, the Federal Reserve Act provides that Federal 
Reserve notes become a first and paramount lien on all the assets 
of the Reserve Banks. Finally, Federal Reserve notes are obligations 
of the United States government. At December 31, 2009 and 2008, 
all Federal Reserve notes issued to the Reserve Banks were fully col-
lateralized. 
“Federal  Reserve  notes  outstanding,  net”  in  the  Statements  of 
Condition  represents  the  Bank’s  Federal  Reserve  notes  outstand-
ing, reduced by the Bank’s currency holdings of $13,731 million and 
$20,767 million at December 31, 2009 and 2008, respectively.
 Other deposits represent amounts held in accounts at the Bank by 
GSEs and foreign central banks and governments.
i. items in process of Collection and Deferred Credit items
“Items in process of collection” in the Statements of Condition 
primarily represents amounts attributable to checks that have been 
deposited for collection and that, as of the balance sheet date, have 
not yet been presented to the paying bank. “Deferred credit items” are 
the counterpart liability to items in process of collection. The amounts 
in this account arise from deferring credit for deposited items until 
the amounts are collected. The balances in both accounts can vary 
significantly. 
j. Capital paid-in
The Federal Reserve Act requires that each member bank sub-
scribe to the capital stock of the Reserve Bank in an amount equal to 6 
percent of the capital and surplus of the member bank. These shares 
are nonvoting with a par value of $100 and may not be transferred or 
hypothecated. As a member bank’s capital and surplus changes, its 
holdings of Reserve Bank stock must be adjusted. Currently, only one-
half of the subscription is paid-in and the remainder is subject to call. 
A member bank is liable for Reserve Bank liabilities up to twice the par 
value of stock subscribed by it.
By law, each Reserve Bank is required to pay each member bank 
an annual dividend of 6 percent on the paid-in capital stock. This 
cumulative  dividend  is  paid  semiannually.  To  reflect  the  Federal 
Reserve Act requirement that annual dividends be deducted from net 
earnings, dividends are presented as a distribution of comprehensive 
income in the Statements of Income and Comprehensive Income.
k. surplus
The Board of Governors requires the Reserve Banks to maintain 
a surplus equal to the amount of capital paid-in as of December 31 
of each year. Accumulated other comprehensive income is reported 
as a component of surplus in the Statements of Condition and the 
Statements of Changes in Capital. The balance of accumulated other 
comprehensive income is comprised of expenses, gains, and losses 
related to other postretirement benefit plans that, under GAAP, are 
included  in  other  comprehensive  income,  but  excluded  from  net 
income. Additional information regarding the classifications of accu-
mulated other comprehensive income is provided in Notes 12 and 13.
l. interest on Federal reserve notes
The Board of Governors requires the Reserve Banks to transfer 
excess earnings to the Treasury as interest on Federal Reserve notes 
after providing for the costs of operations, payment of dividends, and 
reservation of an amount necessary to equate surplus with capital 
paid-in. This amount is reported as “Payments to U.S. Treasury as 
interest on Federal Reserve notes” in the Statements of Income and 
Comprehensive Income. The amount due to the Treasury is reported 
as  “Accrued  interest  on  Federal  Reserve  notes”  in  the  Statements 
of  Condition.  If  overpaid  during  the  year,  the  amount  is  reported 
as “Prepaid interest on Federal Reserve notes” in the Statements of 
Condition. Payments are made weekly to the Treasury. 
In the event of losses or an increase in capital paid-in at a Reserve 
Bank,  payments  to  the  Treasury  are  suspended  and  earnings  are 
retained until the surplus is equal to the capital paid-in. 
In the event of a decrease in capital paid-in, the excess surplus, 
after equating capital paid-in and surplus at December 31, is distrib-
uted to the Treasury in the following year.
m. interest on Depository institution Deposits
On  October  9,  2008,  the  Reserve  Banks  began  paying  interest 
to depository institutions on qualifying balances held at the Banks. 
The interest rates paid on required reserve balances and excess bal-
ances are determined by the Board of Governors, based on an FOMC-
established target range for the effective federal funds rate.
n. income and Costs related to treasury services
The Bank is required by the Federal Reserve Act to serve as fiscal 
agent and depositary of the United States government. By statute, 
the Department of the Treasury has appropriations to pay for these 
services. During the years ended December 31, 2009 and 2008, the 
Bank was reimbursed for all services provided to the Department of 
the Treasury as its fiscal agent.
o. Compensation received for services provided 
The Federal Reserve Bank of Atlanta (“FRBA”) has overall respon-
sibility for managing the Reserve Banks’ provision of check and ACH 
services to depository institutions and, as a result, recognizes total 
System revenue for these services on its Statements of Income and 
Comprehensive Income. Similarly, the FRBNY manages the Reserve 
Banks’ provision of Fedwire funds and securities services and rec-
ognizes total System revenue for these services on its Consolidated 
Statements of Income and Comprehensive Income. The FRBA and 
the FRBNY compensate the applicable Reserve Banks for the costs 
incurred  to  provide  these  services.  The  Bank  reports  this  com-
pensation as “Compensation received for services provided” in the 
Statements of Income and Comprehensive Income.
p. Assessments by the board of governors 
The Board of Governors assesses the Reserve Banks to fund its 
operations based on each Reserve Bank’s capital and surplus balanc-
es as of December 31 of the prior year. The Board of Governors also 
assesses each Reserve Bank for the expenses incurred by the Treasury 
to produce and retire Federal Reserve notes based on each Reserve Financials
Bank’s  share  of  the  number  of  notes  comprising  the  System’s  net 
liability for Federal Reserve notes on December 31 of the prior year.
q. taxes
The Reserve Banks are exempt from federal, state, and local taxes, 
except for taxes on real property. The Bank’s real property taxes were 
$4 million for each of the years ended December 31, 2009 and 2008, 
and are reported as a component of “Occupancy expense.” 
r. restructuring Charges
The  Reserve  Banks  recognize  restructuring  charges  for  exit  or 
disposal costs incurred as part of the closure of business activities in 
a particular location, the relocation of business activities from one 
location  to  another,  or  a  fundamental  reorganization  that  affects 
the  nature  of  operations.  Restructuring  charges  may  include  costs 
associated  with  employee  separations,  contract  terminations,  and 
asset impairments. Expenses are recognized in the period in which 
the Bank commits to a formalized restructuring plan or executes the 
specific actions contemplated in the plan and all criteria for financial 
statement recognition have been met.
Note 14 describes the Bank’s restructuring initiatives and provides 
information about the costs and liabilities associated with employee 
separations and contract terminations. Costs and liabilities associated 
with enhanced pension benefits in connection with the restructuring 
activities for all of the Reserve Banks are recorded on the books of the 
FRBNY.
s. recently issued Accounting standards
In February 2008, FASB issued FSP SFAS 140-3, Accounting for 
Transfers of Financial Assets and Repurchase Financing Transactions, 
(codified in FASB ASC Topic 860 (ASC 860), Transfers and Servicing). 
ASC 860 requires that an initial transfer of a financial asset and a 
repurchase financing that was entered into contemporaneously with, 
or in contemplation of, the initial transfer be evaluated together as a 
linked transaction unless certain criteria are met. These provisions of 
ASC 860 are effective for the Bank’s financial statements for the year 
beginning on January 1, 2009, and have not had a material effect on 
the Bank’s financial statements. The requirements of this standard 
have been reflected in the accompanying footnotes. 
In June 2009, FASB issued SFAS 166, Accounting for Transfers of 
Financial Assets – an amendment to FASB Statement No. 140, (codi-
fied in ASC 860). The new guidance modifies existing guidance to 
eliminate the scope exception for qualifying special purpose vehicles 
(“SPVs”) and clarifies that the transferor must consider all arrange-
ments  of  the  transfer  of  financial  assets  when  determining  if  the 
transferor has surrendered control. These provisions of ASC 860 are 
effective for the Bank’s financial statements for the year beginning on 
January 1, 2010, and earlier adoption is prohibited. The adoption of 
this standard is not expected to have a material effect on the Bank’s 
financial statements. 
In May 2009, FASB issued SFAS No. 165, Subsequent Events, (codi-
fied in FASB ASC Topic 855 (ASC 855), Subsequent Events), which 
establishes general standards of accounting for and disclosing events 
that occur after the balance sheet date but before financial statements 
are issued or are available to be issued. ASC 855 sets forth (i) the 
period after the balance sheet date during which management of a 
reporting entity should evaluate events or transactions that may occur 
for potential recognition or disclosure in the financial statements; (ii) 
the circumstances under which an  entity  should recognize events 
or transactions occurring after the balance sheet date in its financial 
statements; and (iii) the disclosures that an entity should make about 
events  or  transactions  that  occurred  after  the  balance  sheet  date, 
including disclosure of the date through which an entity has evaluated 
subsequent events and whether that represents the date the financial 
statements  were  issued  or  were  available  to  be  issued.  The  Bank 
adopted ASC 855 for the period ended December 31, 2009, and the 
required disclosures are reflected in Note 15.
In June 2009, the FASB issued SFAS No. 168, The Statement of 
Financial  Accounting  Standards  Codification  and  the  Hierarchy  of 
Generally Accepted Accounting Principles, a replacement of SFAS No. 
162, The Hierarchy of Generally Accepted Accounting Principles (SFAS 
168). SFAS 168 establishes the FASB ASC as the source of authorita-
tive accounting principles recognized by the FASB to be applied by 
nongovernmental entities in the preparation of financial statements 
in conformity with GAAP. The ASC does not change current GAAP, 
but it introduces a new structure that organizes the authoritative stan-
dards by topic. SFAS 168 is effective for financial statements issued 
for periods ending after September 15, 2009. As a result, both the ASC 
and the legacy standard are referenced in the Bank’s financial state-
ments and footnotes. 
5. LoAns
The loan amounts outstanding at December 31 were as follows 
(in millions):
2009 2008
Primary, secondary, and seasonal credit $  2 $  692
TAF   390   4,335
total loans to depository institutions $  392 $  5,027
Loans to Depository institutions
The Bank offers primary, secondary, and seasonal credit to eligible 
borrowers. Each program has its own interest rate. Interest is accrued 
using the applicable interest rate established at least every 14 days by 
the board of directors of the Bank, subject to review and determina-
tion by the Board of Governors. Primary and secondary credit are 
extended on a short-term basis, typically overnight, whereas seasonal 
credit may be extended for a period of up to nine months. 
Primary, secondary, and seasonal credit lending is collateralized 
to the satisfaction of the Bank to reduce credit risk. Assets eligible to 
collateralize these loans include consumer, business, and real estate 
loans;  Treasury  securities;  GSE  debt  securities;  foreign  sovereign 
debt; municipal, corporate, and state and local government obliga-
tions;  ABS;  corporate  bonds;  commercial  paper;  and  bank-issued 
assets, such as certificates of deposit, bank notes, and deposit notes. 
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by the Bank, which is typically fair value or face value reduced by a 
margin. 
Depository  institutions  that  are  eligible  to  borrow  under  the 
Bank’s primary credit program are also eligible to participate in the 
TAF program. Under the TAF program, the Reserve Banks conduct 
auctions for a fixed amount of funds, with the interest rate determined 
by the auction process, subject to a minimum bid rate. TAF loans 
are extended on a short-term basis, with terms ranging from 28 to 84 
days. All advances under the TAF program must be collateralized to 
the satisfaction of the Bank. Assets eligible to collateralize TAF loans 
include the complete list noted above for loans to depository institu-
tions. Similar to the process used for primary, secondary, and seasonal 
credit, a lending value is assigned to each asset that is accepted as col-
lateral for TAF loans reduced by a margin. 
Loans to depository institutions are monitored on a daily basis to 
ensure that borrowers continue to meet eligibility requirements for 
these programs. The financial condition of borrowers is monitored 
by the Bank and, if a borrower no longer qualifies for these programs, 
the Bank will generally request full repayment of the outstanding loan 
or, for primary and seasonal credit lending, may convert the loan to a 
secondary credit loan.
Collateral  levels  are  reviewed  daily  against  outstanding  obliga-
tions, and borrowers that no longer have sufficient collateral to sup-
port outstanding loans are required to provide additional collateral or 
to make partial or full repayment.
The  remaining  maturity  distributions  of  loans  outstanding  at 
December 31 were as follows (in millions):
2009
primary, secondary,  
and seasonal Credit tAF
Within 15 days $  2  $  390 
total loans  $  2  $  390 
2008
primary, secondary,  
and seasonal Credit tAF
Within 15 days $  160  $  2,010 
16 days to 90 days   532    2,325 
total loans  $  692  $  4,335 
Allowance for Loan Losses and restructuring
At  December  31,  2009  and  2008,  the  Bank  did  not  have  any 
impaired loans, and no allowance for loan losses was required.
6. treAsurY seCurities; government-sponsoreD enterprise 
Debt seCurities; FeDerAL AgenCY AnD government-
sponsoreD enterprise mortgAge-bACKeD seCurities; 
seCurities purChAseD unDer Agreements to reseLL; 
seCurities soLD unDer Agreements to repurChAse; AnD 
seCurities LenDing
The  FRBNY,  on  behalf  of  the  Reserve  Banks,  holds  securities 
bought outright in the SOMA. The Bank’s allocated share of SOMA 
balances  was  approximately  4.835  percent  and  4.148  percent  at 
December 31, 2009 and 2008, respectively.
The Bank’s allocated share of Treasury securities, GSE debt secu-
rities, and federal agency and GSE MBS, excluding accrued interest, 













Par $  891 $  27,479 $  9,179 $  37,549 $  7,730 $  43,921
Unamortized  
premiums
  —   316   1,183   1,499   363   586
Unaccreted  
discounts
  —   (48)   (30)   (78)   (1)   (75)
total amortized 
cost
$  891 $  27,747 $  10,332 $  38,970 $  8,092 $  44,432













Par $  764 $  13,887 $  5,091 $  19,742 $  817 $  —
Unamortized  
premiums
  —   12   278   290   44   —
Unaccreted  
discounts
  —   (35)   (26)   (61)   (1)   —
total amortized 
cost
$  764 $  13,864 $  5,343 $  19,971 $  860 $  —
Fair value $  764 $  14,838 $  7,029 $  22,631 $  865 $  —Financials
The total of the Treasury securities, GSE debt securities, and fed-
eral agency and GSE MBS, net, excluding accrued interest held in the 













Amortized cost $  18,423 $ 573,877 $ 213,672 $ 805,972 $ 167,362 $ 918,927













Amortized cost $  18,422 $ 334,217 $ 128,810 $ 481,449 $  20,740 $  —
Fair value $  18,422 $ 357,709 $ 169,433 $ 545,564 $  20,863 $  —
The fair value amounts in the above tables are presented solely 
for informational purposes. Although the fair value of security hold-
ings can be substantially greater than or less than the recorded value 
at any point in time, these unrealized gains or losses have no effect 
on the ability of the Reserve Banks, as the central bank, to meet their 
financial obligations and responsibilities. Fair value was determined 
by reference to quoted market values for identical securities, except 
for federal agency and GSE MBS for which fair values were deter-
mined using a model-based approach based on observable inputs for 
similar securities. 
The  fair  value  of  the  fixed-rate  Treasury  securities,  GSE  debt 
securities, and federal agency and GSE MBS in the SOMA’s holdings 
is subject to market risk, arising from movements in market variables, 
such as interest rates and securities prices. The fair value of federal 
agency and GSE MBS is also affected by the rate of prepayments of 
mortgage loans underlying the securities. 
The following table provides additional information on the amor-
tized cost and fair values of the federal agency and GSE MBS portfolio 
at December 31, 2009 (in millions):
Distribution of mbs 
holdings by Coupon rate
Amortized Cost Fair value
Allocated to the bank:
4.0% $  8,225 $  8,014
4.5%   21,002   20,870
5.0%   9,449   9,497
5.5%   4,998   5,057
6.0%   615   624
Other 1   143   145
total $  44,432 $  44,207
system total:
4.0% $  170,119 $  165,740
4.5%   434,352   431,646
5.0%   195,418   196,411
5.5%   103,379   104,583
6.0%   12,710   12,901
Other 1   2,949   3,009
total $  918,927 $  914,290
1 Represents less than one percent of the total portfolio.
Financial  information  related  to  securities  purchased  under 
agreements to resell and securities sold under agreements to repur-
chase for the years ended December 31, 2009 and 2008, was as fol-
lows (in millions):
securities purchased 
under Agreements to  
resell
securities sold under  
Agreements to  
repurchase
2009 2008 2009 2008
Allocated to the bank:
Contract amount out-
standing, end of the year
$   — $   3,318 $  3,758 $  3,665
Average daily amount 
outstanding, during  
the year




  —   4,936   3,758   4,088
Securities pledged, end 
of the year
  —   —   3,765   3,273
system total:
Contract amount out-
standing, end of the year
$  — $  80,000 $  77,732 $  88,352
Average daily amount 
outstanding, during  
the year




  —   119,000   77,732   98,559
Securities pledged, end 
of the year
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The Bank has revised its disclosure of securities purchased under 
agreements to resell and securities sold under agreements to repur-
chase from a weighted average calculation, disclosed in 2008, to the 
simple  daily  average  calculation,  disclosed  above.  The  previously 
reported System total 2008 weighted average amount outstanding for 
securities purchased under agreements to resell was $97,037 million, 
of which $4,025 million was allocated to the Bank. The previously 
reported System total 2008 weighted average amount outstanding for 
securities sold under agreements to repurchase was $65,461 million, 
of which $2,715 million was allocated to the Bank.
The contract amounts for securities purchased under agreements 
to resell and securities sold under agreements to repurchase approxi-
mate fair value.
The remaining maturity distribution of Treasury securities, GSE 
debt securities, federal agency and GSE MBS bought outright, secu-
rities  purchased  under  agreements  to  resell,  and  securities  sold 
under agreements to repurchase that were allocated to the Bank at 


























days $  562 $  3 $  — $  — $  3,758
16 days to  
90 days   1,395   147   —   —   —
91 days to  
1 year   2,455   1,041   —     —   —
Over 1 year 
to 5 years   15,805   4,806   1   —   —
Over 5 years 
to 10 years   10,333   1,634   1   —   —
Over 10 




$  37,549 $  7,730 $  43,921 $  — $  3,758
Federal agency and GSE MBS are reported at stated maturity in 
the table above. The estimated weighted average life of these securi-
ties  at  December  31,  2009,  which  differs  from  the  stated  maturity 
primarily because it factors in prepayment assumptions, is approxi-
mately 6.4 years. 
At December 31, 2009 and 2008, Treasury securities and GSE debt 
securities with par values of $21,610 million and $180,765 million, 
respectively, were loaned from the SOMA, of which $1,045 million 
and $7,498 million, respectively, were allocated to the Bank.
At  December  31,  2009,  the  total  of  other  investments  was  $5 
million, of which the Bank’s allocated share was immaterial. Other 
investments consist of cash and short-term investments related to the 
federal agency and GSE MBS portfolio.
At December 31, 2009, the total of other liabilities was $601 mil-
lion, of which $29 million was allocated to the Bank. These other liabil-
ities, which are related to purchases of federal agency and GSE MBS, 
arise from the failure of a seller to deliver securities to the FRBNY on 
the settlement date. Although the Bank has ownership of and records 
its investments in the MBS as of the contractual settlement date, it is 
not obligated to make payment until the securities are delivered, and 
the amount reported as other liabilities represents the Bank’s obliga-
tion to pay for the securities when delivered.
The FRBNY enters into commitments to buy federal agency and 
GSE MBS and records the related MBS on a settlement-date basis.  As 
of December 31, 2009, the total purchase price of the federal agency 
and GSE MBS under outstanding commitments was $160,099 mil-
lion, of which $32,838 million was related to dollar roll transactions. 
The  amount  of  outstanding  commitments  allocated  to  the  Bank 
was $7,741 million, of which $1,588 million was related to dollar roll 
transactions. These commitments, which had contractual settlement 
dates extending through March 2010, are primarily for the purchase 
of TBA MBS for which the number and identity of the pools that will 
be delivered to fulfill the commitment are unknown at the time of the 
trade.  These commitments are subject to market and counterparty 
risks that result from their future settlement. As of December 31, 2009, 
the fair value of federal agency and GSE MBS under outstanding com-
mitments was $158,868 million, of which $7,681 million was allocated 
to the Bank. During the year ended December 31, 2009, the Reserve 
Banks recorded net gains from dollar roll related sales of $879 million, 
of which $44 million was allocated to the Bank. These net gains are 
reported as “Non-Interest Income (Loss): Federal agency and govern-
ment-sponsored enterprise mortgage-backed securities gains, net” in 
the Statements of Income and Comprehensive Income. 
7. investments DenominAteD in Foreign CurrenCies
The FRBNY, on behalf of the Reserve Banks, holds foreign cur-
rency  deposits  with  foreign  central  banks  and  with  the  Bank  for 
International  Settlements  and  invests  in  foreign  government  debt 
instruments. These investments are guaranteed as to principal and 
interest by the issuing foreign governments. In addition, the FRBNY 
enters into transactions to purchase foreign-currency-denominated 
government-debt securities under agreements to resell for which the 
accepted collateral is the debt instruments issued by the governments 
of Belgium, France, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, and Spain.
The Bank’s allocated share of investments denominated in foreign 
currencies  was  approximately  1.286  percent  and  1.970  percent  at 
December 31, 2009 and 2008, respectively. Financials
The Bank’s allocated share of investments denominated in foreign 
currencies, including accrued interest, valued at amortized cost and 




Foreign currency deposits $  95 $  110
Securities purchased under agreements 
to resell
  33   80
Government debt instruments   64   91
Japanese yen:
Foreign currency deposits   44   69
Government debt instruments   89   139
total allocated to the bank $  325 $  489
At December 31, 2009 and 2008, the fair value of investments 
denominated in foreign currencies, including accrued interest, allo-
cated to the Bank was $328 million and $493 million, respectively. 
The fair value of government debt instruments was determined by 
reference to quoted prices for identical securities. The cost basis of 
foreign currency deposits and securities purchased under agreements 
to resell, adjusted for accrued interest, approximates fair value. Similar 
to the Treasury securities, GSE debt securities, and federal agency 
and GSE MBS discussed in Note 6, unrealized gains or losses have no 
effect on the ability of a Reserve Bank, as the central bank, to meet its 
financial obligations and responsibilities. The fair value is presented 
solely for informational purposes.
Total Reserve Bank investments denominated in foreign curren-
cies were $25,272 million and $24,804 million at December 31, 2009 
and 2008, respectively. At December 31, 2009 and 2008, the fair value 
of the total Reserve Bank investments denominated in foreign cur-
rencies, including accrued interest, was $25,480 million and $25,021 
million, respectively. 
The remaining maturity distribution of investments denominated 
in foreign currencies that were allocated to the Bank at December 31, 




Within 15 days $   78 $   47 $  125
16 days to 90 days   32   6   38
91 days to 1 year   31   30   61
Over 1 year to 5 years   51   50   101
total allocated to the bank $  192 $  133 $   325
At  December  31,  2009  and  2008,  the  authorized  warehousing 
facility was $5.0 billion, with no balance outstanding.
In connection with its foreign currency activities, the FRBNY may 
enter into transactions that contain varying degrees of off-balance-
sheet market risk that result from their future settlement and counter-
party credit risk. The FRBNY controls these risks by obtaining credit 
approvals, establishing transaction limits, receiving collateral in some 
cases, and performing daily monitoring procedures.
8. CentrAL bAnK LiQuiDitY sWAps
u.s. Dollar Liquidity swaps 
The  Bank’s  allocated  share  of  U.S.  dollar  liquidity  swaps  was 
approximately 1.286 percent and 1.970 percent at December 31, 2009 
and 2008, respectively.
At December 31, 2009 and 2008, the total Reserve Bank amount 
of foreign currency held under U.S. dollar liquidity swaps was $10,272 
million and $553,728 million, respectively, of which $132 million and 
$10,908 million, respectively, was allocated to the Bank.
The remaining maturity distribution of U.S. dollar liquidity swaps 









16 days to 
90 days Total
Australian dollar $  —  $  —  $  —  $  197 $  253 $  450
Danish krone   —   —    —    —   296   296
Euro   84    —    84    2,974    2,765   5,739
Japanese yen   7    —    7    943   1,474   2,417
Korean won   —   —    —    —   204   204
Mexican peso   41   —   41   —   —     —
Norwegian krone   —   —    —    43   119   162
Swedish krona   —   —    —    197    295   492
Swiss franc   —   —    —    379   117   496
U.K. pound   —   —    —    3   649   652
total $  132 $  —  $  132  $  4,736 $  6,172 $ 10,90840     FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF DALLAS • 2009 Annual Report
Foreign Currency Liquidity swaps 
There were no transactions related to the foreign currency liquid-
ity swaps during the years ended December 31, 2008 and 2009. 
9. bAnK premises, eQuipment, AnD soFtWAre
Bank premises and equipment at December 31 were as follows 
(in millions):
2009 2008
Bank premises and equipment:
Land $  63 $  61
Buildings   229   226
Building machinery and equipment   44   38
Construction in progress   1   2
Furniture and equipment   64   74
Subtotal   401   401
Accumulated depreciation   (125)   (123)
bank premises and equipment, net $  276 $  278
Depreciation expense, for the years ended 
December 31
$  17 $  15
The Bank leases space to outside tenants with remaining lease 
terms ranging from six to eight years. Rental income from such leases 
was $3 million and $2 million for the years ended December 31, 2009 
and  2008,  respectively,  and  is  reported  as  a  component  of  “Other 
income” in the Statements of Income and Comprehensive Income. 
Future minimum lease payments that the Bank will receive under 
noncancelable lease agreements in existence at December 31, 2009, 
are as follows (in thousands):
2010 $  1,176
2011   1,178
2012   1,178
2013   1,178
2014   1,178
Thereafter   2,173
total $  8,061
The Bank had capitalized software assets, net of amortization, of 
$3 million for each of the years ended December 31, 2009 and 2008. 
Amortization expense was $2 million for each of the years ended 
December 31, 2009 and 2008. Capitalized software assets are report-
ed as a component of “Other assets” in the Statements of Condition 
and the related amortization is reported as a component of “Other 
expenses” in the Statements of Income and Comprehensive Income.
10. Commitments AnD ContingenCies
In the normal course of its operations, the Bank enters into con-
tractual commitments, normally with fixed expiration dates or termi-
nation provisions, at specific rates and for specific purposes.
At December 31, 2009, the Bank was obligated under noncancel-
able leases for premises and equipment with remaining terms rang-
ing from one to approximately two years. These leases provide for 
increased rental payments based upon increases in real estate taxes, 
operating costs, or selected price indices.
Rental expense under operating leases for certain operating facili-
ties, warehouses, and data processing and office equipment (includ-
ing taxes, insurance, and maintenance when included in rent), net 
of sublease rentals, was $231 thousand and $235 thousand for the 
years ended December 31, 2009 and 2008, respectively. Certain of the 
Bank’s leases have options to renew.
Future minimum rental payments under noncancelable operat-
ing leases and capital leases, net of sublease rentals, with terms of one 
year or more, at December 31, 2009, were not material. 
At December 31, 2009, there were no material unrecorded uncon-
ditional purchase commitments or obligations in excess of one year. 
Under the Insurance Agreement of the Federal Reserve Banks, 
each of the Reserve Banks has agreed to bear, on a per incident basis, 
a pro rata share of losses in excess of 1 percent of the capital paid-in of 
the claiming Reserve Bank, up to 50 percent of the total capital paid-in 
of all Reserve Banks. Losses are borne in the ratio of a Reserve Bank’s 
capital paid-in to the total capital paid-in of all Reserve Banks at the 
beginning of the calendar year in which the loss is shared. No claims 
were outstanding under the agreement at December 31, 2009 or 2008.
11. retirement AnD thriFt pLAns
retirement plans
The Bank currently offers three defined benefit retirement plans 
to its employees, based on length of service and level of compensa-
tion. Substantially all of the employees of the Reserve Banks, Board 
of Governors, and Office of Employee Benefits of the Federal Reserve 
System (“OEB”) participate in the Retirement Plan for Employees of 
the Federal Reserve System (“System Plan”). In addition, employees 
at certain compensation levels participate in the Benefit Equalization 
Retirement Plan (“BEP”), and certain Reserve Bank officers participate 
in the Supplemental Retirement Plan for Select Officers of the Federal 
Reserve Bank (“SERP”). 
The System Plan provides retirement benefits to employees of the 
Federal Reserve Banks, the Board of Governors, and OEB. The FRBNY, 
on behalf of the System, recognizes the net asset or net liability and 
costs  associated  with  the  System  Plan  in  its  financial  statements. 
Costs associated with the System Plan are not reimbursed by other 
participating employers.
The Bank’s projected benefit obligation, funded status, and net 
pension expenses for the BEP and the SERP at December 31, 2009 
and 2008, and for the years then ended, were not material.Financials
thrift plan
Employees  of  the  Bank  participate  in  the  defined  contribution 
Thrift  Plan  for  Employees  of  the  Federal  Reserve  System  (“Thrift 
Plan”). The Bank matches employee contributions based on a speci-
fied  formula.  For  the  year  ended  December  31,  2008,  and  for  the 
first three months of the year ended December 31, 2009, the Bank 
matched 80 percent of the first 6 percent of employee contributions 
for employees with less than five years of service and 100 percent of 
the first 6 percent of employee contributions for employees with five 
or more years of service. Effective April 1, 2009, the Bank matches 100 
percent of the first 6 percent of employee contributions from the date 
of hire and provides an automatic employer contribution of 1 percent 
of eligible pay. The Bank’s Thrift Plan contributions totaled $4 million 
for each of the years ended December 31, 2009 and 2008, respectively, 
and are reported as a component of “Salaries and other benefits” in 
the Statements of Income and Comprehensive Income.
12. postretirement beneFits other thAn retirement pLAns 
AnD postempLoYment beneFits
postretirement benefits other than retirement plans
In addition to the Bank’s retirement plans, employees who have 
met certain age and length-of-service requirements are eligible for 
both medical benefits and life insurance coverage during retirement.
The Bank funds benefits payable under the medical and life insur-
ance plans as due and, accordingly, has no plan assets.
Following is a reconciliation of the beginning and ending balances 
of the benefit obligation (in millions):
  2009   2008
Accumulated postretirement benefit  
obligation at January 1
$  83.8 $  77.8
Service cost-benefits earned during the 
period
  3.0   3.1
Interest cost on accumulated benefit 
obligation
  5.0   5.0
Net actuarial loss   3.5   2.7
Curtailment gain   —   (1.5)
Contributions by plan participants   1.3   1.2
Benefits paid   (4.8)   (4.7)
Medicare Part D subsidies   0.3   0.2
Accumulated postretirement  
benefit obligation at December 31
$  92.1 $  83.8
At December 31, 2009 and 2008, the weighted-average discount 
rate assumptions used in developing the postretirement benefit obli-
gation were 5.75 percent and 6.00 percent, respectively.
Discount rates reflect yields available on high-quality corporate 
bonds that would generate the cash flows necessary to pay the plan’s 
benefits when due.
Following is a reconciliation of the beginning and ending balance 
of the plan assets, the unfunded postretirement benefit obligation, and 
the accrued postretirement benefit costs (in millions):
  2009   2008
Fair value of plan assets at January 1 $  — $  —
Contributions by the employer   3.2   3.3
Contributions by plan participants   1.3   1.2
Benefits paid   (4.8)   (4.7)
Medicare Part D subsidies   0.3   0.2
Fair value of plan assets at December 31 $  — $  —
unfunded obligation and accrued 
postretirement benefit cost
$  92.1 $  83.8
Amounts included in accumulated other  
comprehensive loss are shown below:
Prior service cost $  1.5 $  1.9
Net actuarial loss   (19.6)   (17.2)
Deferred curtailment gain   —   0.2
total accumulated other comprehensive loss $  (18.1) $  (15.1)
Accrued postretirement benefit costs are reported as a compo-
nent of “Accrued benefit costs” in the Statements of Condition. 
For measurement purposes, the assumed health care cost trend 
rates at December 31 are as follows:
2009 2008
Health care cost trend rate assumed for next 
year
7.50% 7.50%
Rate to which the cost trend rate is assumed 
to decline (the ultimate trend rate)
5.00% 5.00%
Year that the rate reaches the ultimate trend 
rate
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Assumed health care cost trend rates have a significant effect on 
the  amounts  reported  for  health  care  plans.  A  1  percentage  point 
change in assumed health care cost trend rates would have the follow-






 percentage  
point  
Decrease
Effect on aggregate of service and interest 
cost components of net periodic  
postretirement benefit costs
$  1.4 $  (1.1)
Effect on accumulated postretirement 
benefit obligation
  12.0   (10.0)
The following is a summary of the components of net periodic 
postretirement benefit expense for the years ended December 31 (in 
millions):
  2009   2008
Service cost-benefits earned during the 
period
$  3.0 $  3.1
Interest cost on accumulated benefit  
obligation
  5.0   5.0
Amortization of prior service cost   (0.4)   (0.5)
Amortization of net actuarial loss   1.1   1.3
total periodic expense   8.7   8.9
Curtailment gain   (0.2)   —
net periodic postretirement benefit expense $  8.5 $  8.9
Estimated amounts that will be amortized from 
accumulated other comprehensive loss into 
net periodic postretirement benefit expense 
(credit) in 2010 are shown below:
Prior service cost $  (0.3)
Net actuarial loss   1.5
total $  1.2
Net postretirement benefit costs are actuarially determined using 
a  January  1  measurement  date.  At  January  1,  2009  and  2008,  the 
weighted-average discount rate assumptions used to determine net 
periodic  postretirement  benefit  costs  were  6.00  percent  and  6.25 
percent, respectively. 
Net periodic postretirement benefit expense is reported as a com-
ponent of “Salaries and other benefits” in the Statements of Income 
and Comprehensive Income.
A  net  curtailment  gain  associated  with  restructuring  programs 
that are described in Note 14 was recognized in net income in the 
year ended December 31, 2009, related to employees who terminated 
employment during 2009. A deferred curtailment gain was recorded 
in 2008 as a component of accumulated other comprehensive loss; 
the gain will be recognized in net income in future years when the 
related employees terminate employment.
The Medicare Prescription Drug, Improvement and Modernization 
Act of 2003 established a prescription drug benefit under Medicare 
(“Medicare  Part  D”)  and  a  federal  subsidy  to  sponsors  of  retiree 
health care benefit plans that provide benefits that are at least actuari-
ally equivalent to Medicare Part D. The benefits provided under the 
Bank’s plan to certain participants are at least actuarially equivalent to 
the Medicare Part D prescription drug benefit. The estimated effects 
of the subsidy are reflected in actuarial gain in the accumulated post-
retirement benefit obligation and net periodic postretirement benefit 
expense.
Federal Medicare Part D subsidy receipts were $0.4 million and 
$0.2 million in the years ended December 31, 2009 and 2008, respec-
tively. Expected receipts in 2010, related to benefits paid in the years 
ended December 31, 2009 and 2008, are not material.
Following is a summary of expected postretirement benefit pay-
ments (in millions):
Without subsidy With subsidy
2010 $  4.4 $  4.1
2011   4.9   4.5
2012   5.3   4.8
2013   5.7   5.2
2014   6.1   5.6
2015–2019   36.9   33.1
total $  63.3 $  57.3
postemployment benefits 
The  Bank  offers  benefits  to  former  or  inactive  employees. 
Postemployment benefit costs are actuarially determined and include 
the cost of medical and dental insurance, survivor income, disabil-
ity benefits, and self-insured workers’ compensation expenses. The 
accrued  postemployment  benefit  costs  recognized  by  the  Bank  at 
December 31, 2009 and 2008, were $9 million and $6 million, respec-
tively. This cost is included as a component of “Accrued benefit costs” 
in the Statements of Condition. Net periodic postemployment benefit 
expense included in 2009 and 2008 operating expenses were $3 mil-
lion and $162 thousand, respectively, and are recorded as a compo-
nent of “Salaries and other benefits” in the Statements of Income and 
Comprehensive Income. Financials
13. ACCumuLAteD other Comprehensive inCome AnD other 
Comprehensive inCome
Following is a reconciliation of beginning and ending balances of 
accumulated other comprehensive loss (in millions): 
Amount related to  
postretirement 
benefits other than 
retirement plans
balance at January 1, 2008  $  (15)
Change in funded status of benefit plans:
Net actuarial loss arising during the year   (1) 
Amortization of net actuarial loss   1 
Change in funded status of benefit plans—other 
comprehensive loss
  — 
balance at December 31, 2008 $  (15)
Change in funded status of benefit plans:
Net actuarial loss arising during the year $  (4)
Amortization of net actuarial loss   1 
Change in funded status of benefit plans—other 
comprehensive loss
  (3)
balance at December 31, 2009 $  (18)
Additional detail regarding the classification of accumulated other 
comprehensive loss is included in Note 12.
14. business restruCturing ChArges 
2007 and prior restructuring plans
The Bank incurred various restructuring charges prior to 2008 
related  to  restructuring  to  streamline  its  Houston  operations  and 
reduce costs. 
2008 restructuring plans
In 2008, the Reserve Banks announced the acceleration of their check 
restructuring initiatives to align the check processing infrastructure and 
operations with declining check processing volumes. The new infrastruc-
ture consolidates operations into two regional Reserve Bank processing 
sites: in Cleveland, for paper check processing, and Atlanta, for electronic 
check processing.
2009 restructuring plans
In  2009,  the  Bank  announced  that  in  2010  it  will  eliminate  its 
check print-site function, which is the only remaining check operation 
performed by the Bank.
Following is a summary of financial information related to the 
restructuring plans (in millions):










information related to  
restructuring plans as of  
December 31, 2009:
Total expected costs related to 
restructuring activity $  1.0  $  2.9  $  1.1 $  5.0 
Estimated future costs related 
to restructuring activity   —   —   0.1   0.1
Expected completion date   2007   2009   2010   —
reconciliation of liability  
balances:
balance at January 1, 2008 $  0.2  $    —   — $  0.2 
Employee separation costs   —   2.5   —   2.5
Payments   (0.2)   —   —   (0.2)
balance at December 31, 2008 $  — $  2.5   — $  2.5
Employee separation costs   —   —   1.0   1.0
Adjustments   —   (0.2)   —   (0.2)
Payments   —   (2.0)   —   (2.0)
balance at December 31, 2009 $  — $  0.3  $  1.0 $  1.3
Employee  separation  costs  are  primarily  severance  costs  for 
identified staff reductions associated with the announced restructur-
ing plans. Separation costs that are provided under terms of ongoing 
benefit arrangements are recorded based on the accumulated benefit 
earned by the employee. Separation costs that are provided under 
the terms of one-time benefit arrangements are generally measured 
based on the expected benefit as of the termination date and recorded 
ratably over the period to termination. Restructuring costs related to 
employee separations are reported as a component of “Salaries and 
other  benefits”  in  the  Statements  of  Income  and  Comprehensive 
Income. 
Adjustments to the accrued liability are primarily due to changes 
in the estimated restructuring costs and are shown as a component 
of the appropriate expense category in the Statements of Income and 
Comprehensive Income. 
Costs associated with enhanced pension benefits for all Reserve 
Banks are recorded on the books of the FRBNY as discussed in Note 11.
15. subseQuent events
There  were  no  subsequent  events  that  require  adjustments  to 
or disclosures in the financial statements as of December 31, 2009. 
Subsequent events were evaluated through April 21, 2010, which is 
the date that the Bank issued the financial statements.44     FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF DALLAS • 2009 Annual Report
Volume of Operations
(UNAUDITED)
number of items handled  
(thousands)
Dollar Amount  
(millions)
2009  2008 2009  2008 
serviCes to DepositorY institutions
CAsh serviCes
Federal Reserve notes processed 2,772,001 2,916,096 51,151 53,842
Currency received from circulation 2,930,894 3,054,127 51,736 54,254
Coin received from circulation 599,886 630,008 100 101
CheCK proCessing
Commercial—processed 70,699 430,837 59,496 520,098
Commercial—fine sorted — 2,131 — 789
Check 21 Substitute Check—processed 844,594 243,347 885,536 370,976
LoAns
Advances made  594*  273* 29,574 30,272
* Individual loans, not in thousands.
In 2009, the Board of Governors engaged Deloitte & Touche LLP (D&T) for the audits of the individual and combined financial 
statements of the Reserve Banks and the consolidated financial statements of the limited liability companies (LLCs) that are associated 
with Federal Reserve actions to address the financial crisis and are consolidated in the financial statements of the Federal Reserve Bank 
of New York. Fees for D&T’s services are estimated to be $9.6 million, of which approximately $2.0 million were for the audits of the 
LLCs.1 To ensure auditor independence, the Board of Governors requires that D&T be independent in all matters relating to the audit. 
Specifically, D&T may not perform services for the Reserve Banks or others that would place it in a position of auditing its own work, 
making management decisions on behalf of Reserve Banks, or in any other way impairing its audit independence. In 2009, the Bank 
did not engage D&T for any non-audit services.
1 Each LLC will reimburse the Board of Governors for the fees related to the audit of its financial statements from the entity’s available net assets..
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About the Dallas Fed
The Federal Reserve Bank of Dallas is one of 12 regional Federal Reserve Banks in the United States. 
Together with the Board of Governors in Washington, D.C., these organizations form the Federal Reserve 
System and function as the nation’s central bank. The System’s basic purpose is to provide a flow of money 
and credit that will foster orderly economic growth and a stable dollar. In addition, Federal Reserve Banks 
supervise banks and bank holding companies and provide certain financial services to the banking industry, 
the federal government and the public. 
The Federal Reserve Bank of Dallas has served the financial institutions in the Eleventh District since 
1914. The district encompasses 350,000 square miles and comprises the state of Texas, northern Louisiana 
and southern New Mexico. The three branch offices of the Dallas Fed are in El Paso, Houston and San Antonio.
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